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Francisco runs a small volunteer group in Juxtlahuaca, Mexico.'
Juxtlahuaca is a regional center of Mixteca Baja, a semi-arid, moun-
tainous region of the state of Oaxaca, with a large indigenous popula-
tion that remains one of the most economically and politically margin-
alized in Mexico. 2 Francisco's volunteer group receives no outside
funding, has no staff, nor is it officially incorporated. Francisco
started it a few years ago, having grown tired of national projects that
attempted to direct local affairs from afar. Francisco and the group's
other regular participants squeeze in their activities between their job
and family commitments. They often hold meetings in the small
1. For purposes of confidentiality, names have been changed.
2. Kenneth D. Roberts, Agrarian Structure and Labor Mobility in Rural Mex-
ico, 8 POPULATION & DEV. REv. 299, 303 (1982).
2
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hardware shop Francisco owns. The group has several ongoing pro-
jects that include seeking to strengthen traditional organic agricultural
practices with area farmers and working with residents to remove gar-
bage from a nearby stream. In 2000, the group organized a conference
on environmental concerns which attracted hundreds of participants
from surrounding local communities.
It was largely by chance that Francisco first got involved in the
North American Commission for Environmental Cooperation
(CEC)-a tri-national institution established under the North Ameri-
can Agreement for Environmental Cooperation (NAAEC), a side
agreement to the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).3
Francisco had never participated in an international forum, nor had he
ever heard of the CEC during its seven-year existence. However, in
2003 he learned by word of mouth that the CEC was planning to hold
a forum in Oaxaca City to develop policy recommendations on the in-
troduction of genetically-modified (GM) maize into Mexico. Fran-
cisco, who had long believed political authorities respond to strength
in numbers, decided to attend. He made the six-hour journey through
winding mountain roads and stark landscapes studded with cacti to the
handsome, restored historical center of Oaxaca City with its caf6-
rimmed plazas that beckon to tourists and offset the five-star hotel
where the forum would take place.
Two years later, at a CEC meeting he had received an invitation to
attend, Francisco would gesture jokingly at the one suit he owns and
remark that he goes to such meetings "in disguise," masking his in-
digenous self. Still, he becomes visibly animated when describing the
Oaxaca Maize Symposium of 2003-the hundreds of protesters, the
row upon row of participants defying the moderator's instructions to
limit their comments to two minutes, and the sense that finally here
was an international space that, however momentarily, was being
taken over by local actors. Over time, Francisco will decide to scale
back his CEC involvement. Subsequent meetings strike him as bu-
reaucratic affairs, full of "just talk." Perhaps, he muses, he will one
day consider participating again; for now he will continue his local
3. North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, U.S.-Can.-
Mex., Sept. 14, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1480 [hereinafter NAAEC]. The NAAEC and
documents published by the Commission for Environmental Cooperation (CEC),
including citizen submissions and factual records, are available at the CEC's Web-
site (www.cec.org) [hereinafter CEC Website].
3
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work. This past summer he planted local organic potatoes on the hill-
sides neighboring his village.
INTRODUCTION
The story of Francisco's participation in the CEC opens this arti-
cle because it describes a form of civil society participation in interna-
tional arenas not typically recounted in international law scholarship
or in other research on emergent transnational public spaces. While
an increasing number of scholars, both legal and otherwise, have at-
tempted to devote greater attention to more fully understanding the re-
lationship between civil society groups, international institutions, and
laws and norms, much of this research has focused on the long-term
participation of cosmopolitan transnational networks.4 However, ex-
periences of individuals such as Francisco hint at the wider array of
interactions civil society actors can have with international institu-
tions, thereby challenging traditional formulations of what it means to
participate in international institutions.
This article attempts to respond to this wider array of civil society
experiences by developing two types of claims, one theoretical and
one empirical. On a theoretical level, it argues that international law
scholarship should build on recent trends in social and political sci-
ence to expand the range of interactions between civil society groups
and international institutions that it studies. Specifically, it argues that
international law research should broaden its analysis from an empha-
sis on the "primary" consequences of international institutions on state
actors, to also include an assessment of the "secondary" consequences
of those institutions, such as their impacts on civil society groups'
identities, issue framing, and networks. Increased attention to secon-
dary consequences is critical for understanding the actual impacts of
4. See generally MARGARET KECK & KATHRYN SIKKINK, ACTIVISTS BEYOND
BORDERS 200 (1998) (discussing transnational advocacy networks organized around
shared values and discourses); Jackie Smith et al., Social Movements and World
Politics, in TRANSNATIONAL SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND GLOBAL POLITICS 59, 73
(Jackie Smith et al. eds., 1997) (suggesting that transnational social movements are
important actors in global politics); SIDNEY TARROW, THE NEW TRANSNATIONAL
ACTIVISM 29 (2005) (describing how transnational activists, as "rooted cosmopoli-
tans.., engage in contentious political activities that involve them in transnational
networks of contacts and conflicts").
4
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international institutions and policies. On an empirical level, the arti-
cle proposes that, to the extent that legal scholars care about the actual
effects of international institutions on civil society groups, it is criti-
cally important to gather data on civil society groups' interactions
with international institutions and on how that interaction shapes their
behaviors.
After outlining these arguments in Part I, the article develops a
qualitative analysis of Mexican civil society activists' experiences
with the CEC. Part II provides background information on the CEC
for readers unfamiliar with the institution and its mechanisms, while
Part III includes an analysis of interviews with Mexican activists. The
purpose of the interview analysis is not to evaluate the effectiveness of
the CEC from a policy standpoint. Rather, it is to explore one set of
secondary consequences-the impact of the CEC on activists' transna-
tional and domestic networks. Networks were selected as the focus of
analysis for two main reasons. First, despite the theoretical impor-
tance placed on networks in much of the legal literature on civil soci-
ety organizations and international institutions, relatively little empiri-
cal data has been gathered on this topic. Second, an understanding of
networks and their formation is critical for understanding other types
of activities central to civil society organizations, such as their legiti-
macy, strategies, tactics, and access to material resources.
The data analysis in Part HI finds that despite the emphasis on
transnational activist networks in much legal literature on the CEC
and on international institutions generally, the CEC has only func-
tioned to a limited extent as an institutional platform for newly emer-
gent or already existing transnational civil society networks. Part III
describes some of the factors that have contributed to this and dis-
cusses findings that in some cases the CEC's impact on Mexican ac-
tivists' involvement in domestic networks may have been more sig-
nificant than its impact on those activists' involvement in
transnational networks. These findings are used to explore larger
questions such as the circumstances under which international institu-
tions foster civil society participation, the types of participation that
emerge, and prescriptively, the types of participation such institutions
should foster. It is argued that an empirical analysis of international
institutions' secondary consequences on civil society networks can
make more visible the ways in which international institutions both
5
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can and should foster a wider array of forms of civil society participa-
tion than international law scholars have traditionally emphasized.
I. THE NEED TO EVALUATE THE SECONDARY CONSEQUENCES OF
INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS
Recent years have seen a profound shift in social and political sci-
ence research on the relationship between international institutions
and civil society actors. Traditionally, researchers have focused on
how international institutions mediate the relationship between civil
society actors and the state.5 Consequently, the impact and signifi-
cance of civil society actors was mainly understood in terms of "the
primary consequences" of civil society actors' impact on state or gov-
ernmental practices and policies. 6 Critics of this approach have ar-
gued it represents an overly narrow, state-centered view of politics
that relies on an artificial separation between civil society and govern-
ance activities.7 Recent critics within international law have also
raised similar criticisms against traditional international law scholar-
ship, stating that it adheres to a state-centered perspective that refuses
to recognize the wide variety of fluid and decentralized spaces in
which law and politics take place.8
In part as a result of this emergent body of criticism, there has
been an increasing interest among social and political scientists in the
5. See, e.g., PAUL WAPNER, ENVIRONMENTAL ACTIVISM AND WORLD CIVIC
POLITICS 12 (1996) (stating that, until recently in studies, NGOs "gained prominence
only to the degree that they affected state policies" and that "their influence on
world affairs apart from this role was neglected").
6. See, e.g., Harold K. Jacobson, International Institutions and System Trans-
formation, 3 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 149, 154 (2000) (arguing that, traditionally, re-
search has tended to focus on the "primary consequences" of international institu-
tions, that is, their direct effect on international relations regarding a particular
issue); WAPNER, supra note 5, at 152 ("The conventional understanding is that envi-
ronmental activists are politically effective when they influence state behavior.").
7. See, e.g., WAPNER, supra note 5, at 152-53; THOMAS PRINCEN & MATTHIAS
FINGER, ENVIRONMENTAL NGOs IN WORLD POLITICS 64 (1994); Anne Marie Clark,
Nongovernmental Organizations and Their Influence on International Society, 48 J.
INT'L AFF. 507,513-14 (1995).
8. See Balakrishnan Rajagopal, International Law and Social Movements:
Challenges of Theorizing Resistance, 41 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 397, 402 (2003).
6
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"secondary consequences" of international institutions. 9 For some po-
litical scientists this has meant shifting their focus to examining how
civil society actors have used international political arenas to develop
non-state forms of governance. Other social scientists have focused
greater attention on how civil society groups have used international
institutions to build their networks, gain legitimacy, share tactics, and
project their activities onto alternate political arenas.10 The growing
emphasis on secondary consequences highlights how civil society par-
ticipation in international institutions can have effects that go beyond
narrowly defined outcomes such as direct policy and legal changes.
Like political and social scientists, international law scholars can
benefit from increased attention to international institutions' secon-
dary consequences. Such attention is critical for several reasons.
First, although often unintended by those who design and implement
international institutions, secondary consequences can fundamentally
affect such institutions' impact and functioning. 1" Therefore, an ex-
clusive focus on primary consequences carries the risk of overlooking
many of these institutions' actual impacts. For example, scholars of-
ten observe that international legal mechanisms, including the CEC's,
are ineffective because they are "partial, nonbinding, and unenforce-
able."' 2  While this observation is valuable in the sense that the
NAAEC and other international environmental agreements have
largely not led to formal state enforcement action, it can also result in
the temptation to cut off further analysis-as if this particular form of
9. See, e.g., Jacobson, supra note 6, at 154 (describing increasing scholarly at-
tention paid to secondary consequences of international institutions beginning in the
1990s).
10. See, e.g., Sidney Tarrow, Transnational Politics: Contention and Institu-
tions in International Politics, 4 ANN. REV. POLIT. SCI. 1, 15 (2001); PRINCEN &
FINGER, supra note 7, at 56-60; WAPNER, supra note 5, at 11.
11. See generally Balakrishnan Rajagopal, From Resistance to Renewal: The
Third World, Social Movements, and the Expansion of International Institutions, 41
HARV. INT'L L. J. 529, 541 (2000) (describing how certain international institutions
may have effects not intended or even recognized, but which are nonetheless "effec-
tive").
12. WAPNER, supra note 5, at 23; see, e.g., Roberto A. Sanchez, Governance,
Trade, and the Environment in the Context of NAFTA, 45 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST
1369, 1388-89 (2002); Beatriz Bugeda, Is NAFTA Up To Its Green Expectations?
Effective Law Enforcement Under the North American Agreement on Environmental
Cooperation, 32 U. RICH. L. REV. 1591, 1616 (1999).
7
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ineffectiveness were synonymous with having no effect at all. Social
and political science research on international institutions' secondary
consequences has shown that these institutions do have significant ef-
fects on civil society actors' networks, tactics, political leverage, and
claims-making.' 3 In many instances, such secondary consequences
may be more significant than traditionally acknowledged primary con-
sequences. 14 By paying greater attention to secondary consequences,
international law scholars can make more visible the actual array of
effects that, for better or for worse, international institutions are hav-
ing, and perhaps even more importantly, can open up those effects to
greater analysis and critique.
Second, an emphasis on secondary consequences is beneficial for
international law scholarship to the extent that "soft law" mechanisms
are becoming an increasingly popular vehicle for facilitating public
participation in international institutions, especially in the interna-
tional environmental arena. 15  Soft law mechanisms are defined as
those which lack formal enforcement authority and depend largely on
civil society engagement for their impact. 16 Consequently, their suc-
cess fundamentally depends on the secondary consequences they have
13. See, e.g., Tarrow, supra note 10, at 15. For examples of how social move-
ments formulate their strategy in the context of international institutions, see gener-
ally THE STRUGGLE FOR ACCOUNTABILITY: THE WORLD BANK, NGOs, AND
GRASSROOTS MOVEMENTS (Jonathan A. Fox & L. David Brown eds., 1998);
ROBERT O'BRIEN ET AL., CONTESTING GLOBAL GOVERNANCE: MULTILATERAL
ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS & GLOBAL SOCIAL MOVEMENTS (2000); GLOBAL
INSTITUTIONS AND LOCAL EMPOWERMENT (Kendall Stiles ed., 2000).
14. See generally BALAKRISHNAN RAJAGOPAL, INTERNATIONAL LAW FROM
BELOW: DEVELOPMENT, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, AND THIRD WORLD RESISTANCE 88
(2003) (arguing the importance of recognizing that "international institutions should
no longer be thought of merely in terms of whether they successfully carry out the
functions that they have been assigned, but rather they should be thought of in their
own terms of occupying and politicizing the space of international law").
15. See, e.g., Kal Raustiala, Note, The "Participatory Revolution" in Interna-
tional Environmental Law, 21 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 537, 537 (1997) [hereinafter
Raustiala, The "Participatory Revolution"]; Kal Raustiala, States, NGOs, and Inter-
national Environmental Institutions, 41 INT'L STUD. Q. 719, 719 (1997).
16. See John J. Kirton & Michael J. Trebilcock, Introduction: Hard Choices
and Soft Law in Sustainable Global Governance, in HARD CHOICES, SOFT LAW:
VOLUNTARY STANDARDS IN GLOBAL TRADE, ENVIRONMENT AND SOCIAL
GOVERNANCE 3, 9 (John J. Kirton & Michaeal J. Trebilcock eds., 2004).
8
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on civil society actors. 17 Despite the growing use of soft law mecha-
nisms, relatively little data exists on how civil society actors view and
seek to use such mechanisms to their strategic advantage. Gathering
better data on these matters can be a critical step towards obtaining a
better understanding of how such mechanisms succeed or fail. Such
an empirical approach offers greater insight into who uses soft law
mechanisms and on what terms, helping to illuminate what can all too
often be the "black box" of undifferentiated civil society participation.
It also offers important policy implications because, in contrast to
other areas of law where the proper role of societal pressure on legal
institutions remains controversial, soft law's explicit goal is to encour-
age civil society participation in order to achieve particular substan-
tive outcomes.' 8
Finally, legal scholars have much to contribute to how the secon-
dary consequences of international institutions on civil society actors
are understood. Legal scholarship's longstanding attentiveness to par-
ticular factual circumstances and institutional arrangements make it a
discipline well-positioned to contribute to this area of inquiry. While
social and political scientists tend to emphasize the secondary conse-
17. See generally John H. Knox, Separated at Birth: The North American
Agreements on Labor and the Environment, 26 LOY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. REv.
359, 386 (2004) (arguing that "public participation may be more important to the
success of an international institution than the theoretical possibility of government-
triggered sanctions"); Mark R. Goldschmidt, The Role of Transparency and Public
Participation in International Environmental Agreements, 29 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L.
REv. 343, 347 (2002) (describing how "[p]ublic participation, particularly for non-
government organizations (NGOs), plays a crucial role in the implementation of and
compliance with international environmental treaties"); Bugeda, supra note 12, at
1616-17 (stating that, for the NAAEC to fulfill its potential, "it will be essential to
encourage and to improve the involvement of civil society in the three countries").
18. See generally Kirton & Trebilcock, supra note 16, at 27 (describing how
"[t]he soft law legacy speaks powerfully to the importance of widely participatory,
equally empowering, consensus-oriented multi-stakeholder regimes, and points to
how the 'sunlight' of transparency, properly designed and delivered, can substitute
for the heavy, coercive sanctions of hard law regimes"); Edward L. Rubin, Passing
Through the Door: Social Movement Literature and Legal Scholarship, 150 U. PA.
L. REv. 1, 57-58 (2001) (describing tensions between the "well-established aspira-
tional norm" that policy alternatives be evaluated "on their merits, without attending
to their social origin," and recognizing the importance of social movements in the
origins of those positions).
9
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quences of international institutions in general,' 9 legal scholars can
perform the necessary task of exploring the secondary consequences
of specific institutional mechanisms and use this information to de-
velop novel institutional designs and practices. This approach not
only helps to break down general institutional effects into a more
transparent analysis of the effects of particular institutional mecha-
nisms, it also contributes to better understanding the circumstances
under which one would expect particular secondary consequences,
and why.
Parts II and III apply this framework to an empirical analysis of
the secondary consequences of one soft law international institution,
the CEC, on the transnational and domestic networks of Mexican civil
society actors. Since Part II contains basic background information on
the CEC's institutional structure and mechanisms, readers already fa-
miliar with this topic may wish to skip directly to Part HI.
II. BACKGROUND ON THE NORTH AMERICAN COMMISSION FOR
ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION
The NAAEC was enacted in 1993 as a side agreement to NAFTA,
largely as a result of political pressure from a strategic coalition of La-
tino and environmental groups.20 It represented a "significant mile-
stone" for civil society, reflecting the unprecedented level of public
engagement that led up to the NAFTA negotiations. 2' The NAAEC
established the CEC, a tri-national institution whose stated goals are to
"address regional environmental concerns, help prevent potential trade
and environment conflicts, and to promote the effective enforcement
19. See generally Tarrow, supra note 10, at 2 (arguing that, in research on
transnational politics and international governance, "few mechanisms are proposed
that link domestic actors to transnational ones and to states and international institu-
tions."); see also Sidney Tarrow, The Dualities of Transnational Content: 'Two Ac-
tivist Solitudes' or a New World Altogether?, 10 MOBILIZATION 53, 66 (2005) (sug-
gesting that one of the lacunae within social movement scholarship is a lack of
specification of international institutions and that the institutional parameters of
these institutions should be part of the analysis of transnational activism).
20. See Rail Hinojosa-Ojeda, Integration Policy from the Grassroots Up:
Transnational Implications of Latino, Labor, and Environmental NGO Strategies, in
CROSS-BORDER DIALOGUES: U.S.-MEXICO SOCIAL MOVEMENT NETWORKING 227,
227 (David Brooks & Jonathan Fox eds., 2002).
21. Id. at 228.
10
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of environmental law." 22 Given its agenda, the CEC is a relatively
small organization of about fifty to fifty-eight staff members with an
annual budget of $9 million.23 It organizes over forty meetings per
year, attracting approximately 1,400 participants.
24
Structurally, the CEC consists of three main institutional bodies:
the Council, the Secretariat, and the Joint Public Advisory Committee
(JPAC).25 The Council consists of cabinet-level or equivalent repre-
sentatives of each of the three NAFTA countries, and thus is most
closely linked to the national governments. 26 The Council exercises
ultimate executive authority, and meets at least once a year. 27 The Se-
cretariat is an administrative body consisting of nationals of each
party.28 It provides "operational support to the Council,"29 and pre-
pares reports under some of the NAAEC's public participation mecha-
nisms.30 The third institutional body, the JPAC, is unique among in-
ternational institutions in that it is dedicated to creating a link between
the North American public and the Commission. 31 The JPAC consists
of fifteen volunteer members, appointed by the three national govern-
ments.32 To the largest extent possible, the JPAC makes decisions by
consensus.
33
22. Commission for Environmental Cooperation, Who We Are, http://www.cec.
org/who weare/index.cfm?varlan=english (last visited Nov. 25, 2006).
23. Marc Paquin et al., The Evolution of the Program and Budget of the Com-
mission for Environmental Cooperation of North America (CEC), DISCUSSION
PAPER (Unisfdra International Centre, Montreal, Can.), Sept. 2003, at 2, available at
www.unisfera.org/IMG/pdf/Unisfera -_Evolution-ofCECProgram.pdf.
24. See Marc Paquin et al., JPAC and Public Participation in the Activities of
the Commission for Environmental Cooperation of North America (CEC),
DISCUSSION PAPER, (Unisfdra International Centre, Montreal, Can.), Mar. 2003, at 3
available at http://www.unisfera.org/IMG/pdf/Unisfera_-_CECPublicParticipa
tion.pdf.
25. NAAEC, supra note 3, art. 8(1).
26. Id. art. 9(1).
27. Id. arts. 9(1), 9(3)(b), 10(1).
28. Id. art. 11(2).
29. Id. art. 11(5).
30. Id. arts. 12(1), 13(3).
31. See Eric Dannenmaeir, The JPAC at Ten, 2 (Mar. 2005),
http://www.cec.org/files/PDF/JPAC/JPAC-at-Ten-en.pdf.
32. Paquin et al., supra note 24, at 5.
33. JOINT PUBLIC ADVISORY COMMITTEE, COMMISSION FOR ENVIRONMENTAL
11
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One of the CEC's most notable aspects is the relatively wide vari-
ety of soft law mechanisms it offers for public engagement. 34 This va-
riety offers researchers a valuable opportunity to compare groups' ex-
periences with different mechanisms across the same institution. The
following is a brief description of the four CEC soft law mechanisms
that will be discussed in this article: the Article 14 and 15 citizen peti-
tions, the Article 13 Secretariat report, the CEC working groups, and
the JPAC.
A. The Citizen's Submission Process-Articles 14 and 15
Articles 14 and 15 consist of a complaint-based monitoring sys-
tem in which private individuals or groups in any of the NAFTA
countries can file complaints with the CEC Secretariat alleging that a
NAFTA government is failing to enforce its environmental laws. 35
Once the Secretariat has received a petition, it has broad discretion in
deciding whether to pursue further review, including considering such
factors as alleged harm, available private remedies, and the goals of
the NAAEC.3 6 If the Secretariat accepts the submission, it requests a
response from the governmental party. 37 Based on the governmental
party's response, the Secretariat decides whether to prepare a factual
record, and may do so provided that it receives two-thirds of the
Council's approval.38 In preparing the report, the Secretariat creates a
factual record of the issues and does not include its own evaluations,
conclusions, or subjective judgments. 39 The Secretariat does not have
COOPERATION, JOINT PUBLIC ADVISORY COMMITTEE RULES OF PROCEDURE, Rule 6
(Dec. 2002), available at http:/www.cec.org/files/PDF/JPAC/JPA-dec-2002-en.pdf.
34. See Marc Paquin et al., supra note 24, at 1-2 (stating that "a key feature of
the CEC is its commitment to promoting public participation" and describing some
of the CEC's public participation mechanisms); Raustiala, The "Participatory Revo-
lution," supra note 15, at 549 (noting that "the [NAAEC]... goes further than most
multilateral treaties in terms of NGO access and participation").
35. NAAEC, supra note 3, art. 14(1).
36. Id. art. 14(2).
37. Id.
38. Id. art. 15(l)-(2).
39. Jonathan Graubart, Giving Meaning to New Trade-Linked "Soft Law"
Agreements on Social Values: A Law-in-Action Analysis of NAFTA 's Environmental
Side Agreement, 6 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 425,432-33 (2002).
12
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the authority to make the report publicly available; only the Council
can release the report with two-thirds of its members' approval.4n
B. Secretariat Report-Article 13
Article 13 authorizes the Secretariat to prepare a report without
Council approval on any matter within the CEC program or on any
other matter with Council approval as long as it does not involve alle-
gations of failure to enforce environmental laws and regulations.4n
Like Articles 14 and 15, the Article 13 report can only be released
with the Council's permission.4 2 However, there are several key dif-
ferences between the two mechanisms. First, Article 13 requires that
if the Secretariat lacks specific expertise in the report's subject matter,
it must obtain independent expert assistance.43 Consequently, in Arti-
cle 13, the Secretariat functions less as an impartial, quasi-judicial
body than as a body that convenes an expert panel, relying on special-
ized knowledge.4 Second, Article 13 does not restrict the Secretariat
to factual findings, and all Article 13 reports to date have included
conclusions and recommendations. 45 Third, the Secretariat may inde-
40. NAAEC, supra note 3, art. 15(7).
41. Id. art. 13(1).
42. Id. art. 13(3).
43. Id. art. 13(1).
44. See generally Jonathan Graubart, "Politicizing" a New Breed of "Legal-
ized" Transnational Political Opportunity Structures: Labor Activists Uses of
NAFTA's Citizen-Petition Mechanism, 26 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 97, 99-100
(2005) (discussing the recent proliferation of quasi-judicial mechanisms in interna-
tional agreements on value-based norms).
45. See NAAEC, supra note 3, art. 13 (giving authority to the Secretariat to
prepare a "report"); Report on the Death of Migratory Birds at the Silva Reservoir,
CEC SECRETARIAT REPORT (Commission for Environmental Cooperation, Montreal,
Can.), Oct. 1995, at 63-69 (providing two recommendations to prevent further bird
die-off); Continental Pollutant Pathways, CEC SECRETARIAT REPORT (Commission
for Environmental Cooperation, Montreal, Can.), 1997, at 33-38 (making specific
conclusions and recommendations on collaborative action on continental pollutants);
Ribbon of Life, CEC SECRETARIAT REPORT (Commission for Environmental Coop-
eration, Montreal, Can.), Jun. 1999, at 7-10 (recommending specific actions the
Council may take to better protect the wildlife in the San Pedro basin); Environ-
mental Challenges and Opportunities of the Evolving North American Electricity
Market, CEC SECRETARIAT REPORT (Commission for Environmental Cooperation,
Montreal, Can.), Jun. 2002, at 22-26 (recommending greater North American envi-
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pendently initiate the Article 13 process, although, in practice, it has
also initiated the Article 13 process in response to civil society peti-
tions.46 Finally, Article 13 permits the Secretariat to gather informa-
tion through public consultations such as conferences, seminars, and
symposia.4 v These consultations have served as significant vehicles
for public involvement which have not been available under the citi-
zen petition mechanism.
C. CEC Working Groups and Other Cooperative Activities
The CEC sponsors approximately forty-three working groups. 48
More so than other mechanisms, working groups tend to emphasize
face-to-face stakeholder dialogue on substantive environmental is-
sues.4 9 The groups may consist exclusively of governmental officials,
of appointed experts, or of a mix of non-governmental stakeholders
and other sectors. 50 The groups' activities vary, but generally involve
ronmental cooperation and compatibility); Maize and Biodiversity: The Effects of
Transgenic Maize in Mexico, CEC SECRETARIAT REPORT (Commission for Envi-
ronmental Cooperation, Montreal, Can.), 2004, at 26-30 [hereinafter Maize and Bio-
diversity] (providing recommendations based on the key findings of the report). All
CEC Secretariat Reports available at http://www.cec.org/programs-projects/
other..projects/index.cfm?varlan=english.
46. NAAEC, supra note 3, art. 13(1). See, e.g., Maize and Biodiversity, supra
note 45, at 34-35 (describing petition submitted by Mexican civil society groups re-
questing Article 13 report on the impact of transgenic maize in Mexico).
47. NAAEC, supra note 3, art. 13(2).
48. Paquin et al., supra note 24, at 3.
49. See generally Commission for Environmental Cooperation, Assessing the
Environmental Effects of Trade, Dec. 2002, at 7, available at
http://www.cec.org/files /pdf/ECONOMY/111-03-05_en.pdf (stating one main ele-
ment of the Trade and Environment project is to "[fWacilitate an open, transparent
dialogue to identify options for integration of trade and environmental policies");
Commission for Environmental Cooperation, Enforcement Working Group Website,
http://www.cec.org/ewg/ index.cfm?varlan=english (noting the working group's fo-
cus on "[f]acilitating an intergovernmental dialogue and public discussion"); Com-
mission for Environmental Cooperation, Meeting of the Consultative Group for the
North American PRTR Project, Oct. 20-21, 2004, at 12, http://www.cec.org/files/
PDF/POLLUTANTS/FS03discusspaper-en-pdf (describing the PRTR consultative
group as a forum for exchanging ideas and obtaining stakeholder input).
50. Paquin et al., supra note 24, at 3.
14
California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 37, No. 1 [2006], Art. 3
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol37/iss1/3
2006] THE SECONDARY CONSEQUENCES OF INT'L INSTITUTIONS 77
opportunities to apply a group's conclusions to generating non-
binding recommendations. 5'
D. JPAC-Article 16
The JPAC differs from other CEC mechanisms in that it offers an
institutional space for ongoing public engagement which is not linked
to a particular substantive project. 52 Its main vehicles for public in-
volvement are public meetings, which are usually held four times a
year in the three NAFTA countries. 53 Other avenues for public input
include the submission of written comments and the possibility of ar-
ranging meetings with JPAC members on an ad hoc basis.54
51. See, e.g., Commission for Environmental Cooperation, Draft: North Amer-
ica Air Working Group Long-term Strategic Framework for Air-related Activities of
the Commission for Environmental Cooperation, Nov. 17, 2003, at 1, available at
http://www.cec.org/files/PDF/POLLUTANTS/NAAWGstrategicframeworkraften.
df#search=%22working%20group%20CEC%22 (stating that the working group will
identify strategic directions and opportunities for the air-related activities of the
CEC that are "intended to benefit from the input of a wide range of stakeholders");
Commission for Environmental Cooperation, Strategic and Cooperative Action for
the Conservation of Biodiversity in North America, Dec. 2002, at 24-25, available at
http://www.cec.org/files/pdf/BIODIVERSITY/211-03-05_en.pdf (reporting on ac-
tivities that included soliciting input from various stakeholders to identify priority
areas and to provide advice on "lines of action the CEC could take on various
themes"); Commission for Environmental Cooperation, Working Draft for Public
Input: The CEC SMOC Working Group Strategy Until 2020 Under the Puebla Pri-
ority Areas, Apr. 18, 2006, at 4, available at http://www.cec.org/files/PDF/
POLLUTANTS/SMOC-consolidated-paper-041806_en.pdf (explaining that "the ini-
tial focus of the [Sound Management of Chemicals] working group was for the three
Parties, working with stakeholders, to develop action plans for substances of mutual
concern").
52. See, e.g., Commission for Environmental Cooperation, Who We Are/Joint
Public Advisory Committee (JPAC): Vision Statement, July 26, 1994,
http://www.cec.org/who we are/jpac/vision/index.cfm?varlan=english (noting that
the JPAC's vision is "to ensure active public participation and transparency in the
actions of the Commission" and is "in effect, a model for the future in a process
which is without precedent").
53. Paquin et al., supra note 24, at 6.
54. See, e.g., Interview with Executive Director of National Environmental
NGO, in Guadalajara, Mex. (Feb. 8, 2006) (describing how his organization was
able to arrange individual meetings with JPAC members as a component of its ad-
vocacy work). For a complete listing of public comments submitted to the JPAC,
see Commission for Environmental Cooperation, http://www.cec.org/pubsdocs/
15
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The JPAC offers financial assistance to offset the cost of attending
its meetings. 55 These meetings have covered a wide variety of sub-
jects, including the CEC's program, specific environmental issues,
and CEC policies impacting public participation. 56 To a limited ex-
tent, the JPAC has experimented with different meeting formats.
However, participants generally line-up at a microphone to give com-
ments limited to no more than two minutes.5 7 The JPAC has the dis-
cretion to decide how and whether it incorporates public input into its
communications with the Council.
5 8
III. DATA ANALYSIS OF MEXICAN CivL SOCIETY ACTORS'
EXPERIENCES WITH THE CEC
Part III analyzes Mexican civil society actors' experiences with
the NAAEC. Section A outlines the project's methodology and ra-
tionale. Section B provides factual background on three case-studies
of Mexican civil society engagement with the CEC. Section C in-
cludes the data analysis as well as a discussion of their theoretical and
policy implications for the relationship between soft law mechanisms
and civil society actors.
A. Methodology and Rationale
This study is based on three methods of data gathering: document
review, participant observation, and individual interviews. These
sources were triangulated so as to allow for more "richly detailed,
thick, and holistic" descriptions.59 Documents reviewed consisted of
scope/index.cfm?varlan=english&ID=17 (last visited Oct. 17, 2006).
55. Paquin et al., supra note 24, at 3.
56. See generally Commission for Environmental Cooperation, Publications
and Documents: Joint Public Advisory Committee, http://www.cec.org/pubs-docs/
scope/index.cfm?varlan=english&ID=- 17.
57. Author's personal observation of JPAC meetings.
58. Joint Public Advisory Committee Advice to Council No: 03-03, J/03-
03/ADV/Final, at 3 (Nov. 12, 2003), available at http://www.cec.org/files/pdf/
JPAC/Advice-03-03_en.pdf (stating that while JPAC seeks public input, it is not
bound by public input when developing its advice).
59. David A. Snow & Danny Trom, The Case Study and the Study of Social
Movements, in METHODS OF SOCIAL MOVEMENT RESEARCH 146, 151-52 (Bert
Klandermans & Suzanne Staggenborg eds., 2002).
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CEC documents, media articles, and civil society group materials.
Participant observation involved attending four CEC events over
2005-2006 in Washington, D.C., Montreal, and Mexico City. Qualita-
tive interviews were the principal data source since they were best
suited for gaining insight into the Mexican activists' strategic motiva-
tions and decision-making. 60 Twenty-two face-to-face, individual
"semi-structured" interviews were conducted with Mexican civil soci-
ety group representatives. To obtain a varied sample, interviews were
conducted with individuals from international, national, regional and
local non-governmental organizations as well as grassroots groups,
who self-identified with environmental, indigenous, and campesino61
movements. Each interview lasted between forty-five and ninety
minutes. In accordance with standard social science methods, activ-
ists were guaranteed confidentiality. Confidentiality was critical be-
cause activists were asked to speak frankly about the reasons behind
sensitive internal decisions and strategies. Mexican groups were cho-
sen as the subject of research because, despite Mexican civil society
groups' more extensive use of the CEC's mechanisms, U.S. law jour-
nals have gathered less qualitative data on Mexican groups' experi-
ences than on U.S. and Canadian groups' experiences.62
60. See, e.g., Kathleen M. Blee & Verta Taylor, Semi-Structured Interviewing
in Social Movement Research, in METHODS OF SOCIAL MOVEMENT RESEARCH, su-
pra note 59, at 92, 95.
61. For the purposes of this paper, the term campesino refers to an agricultural-
ist on a small landholding. See generally David Brooks & Jonathan Fox, Move-
ments Across the Border. An Overview, in CROSS-BORDER DIALOGUES: U.S.-
MEXICO SOCIAL MOVEMENT NETWORKING, supra note 20, at 1, 42-43 (describing
differences between small agriculturalists in the United States and Mexico).
62. See, e.g., COMMISSION FOR ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION, TEN-YEAR
REVIEW AND ASSESSMENT COMMITTEE, TEN YEARS OF NORTH AMERICAN
ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION 39-40 (June 15, 2004), available at
http://www.cec.org/files/PDF/TRAC-Report2004-en.pdf (noting that the CEC fills a
relatively larger institutional space in Mexico than it does in Canada or the United
States, and that the CEC has been instrumental in encouraging public participation
in policy development in Mexico, particularly from environmental NGOs). See
generally RAJAGOPAL, supra note 14, at xiii (noting that the lack of a tradition of
socio-legal research in international law has made "thicker," qualitative descriptions
of how norms and institutions evolve uncommon); id. at 294 (urging the importance
of recognizing within international law scholarship that international institutions are
constituted through a complex and ambivalent relationship with the "local," increas-
ingly manifested in the form of social movements in the Third World).
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For context and comparison, interviews were conducted with ac-
tivists who had been involved with the CEC on a variety of issues.
However, the majority of the interviews focused on three case studies
which corresponded to three of the CEC's four main public participa-
tion mechanisms: the Pollutant Registry and Transfer (PRTR) project
(CEC working group),63 the GM maize report (Article 13),64 and the
Lake Chapala citizen petitions (Article 14 and 15).65 Each case at-
tracted relatively high levels of civil society involvement, and thus of-
fered rich data sources for analyzing the CEC's secondary conse-
quences on Mexican activists. The JPAC was not included as a
separate "case study" because it can be used alone or in combination
with other mechanisms; it is instead integrated into the analysis of the
other case studies. The following section includes factual summaries
of the three case studies, which offer basic context for the interview
analysis.
B. Background on the Case Studies: PRTR, GM Maize,
and Lake Chapala
1. CEC Working Group: The PRTR Project
The PRTR project, an effort to establish a comparable North
American pollutant registry, 66 perhaps represents the CEC's and na-
tional governments' most ambitious effort at legally harmonizing en-
vironmental standards between the NAFTA countries. In 1994, fol-
63. See generally CEC Website, supra note 3 (follow "Our Programs and Pro-
jects" hyperlink; then follow "Pollutants and Health" hyperlink) (contains publica-
tions and documents on the CEC's PRTR program).
64. Maize and Biodiversity, supra note 45, at 34-35.
65. Lake Chapala Submission to the Commission for Environmental Coopera-
tion Pursuant to Article 14, A14/SEM/ 97-007/01/SUB, at 1 (Oct. 10, 1997), avail-
able at http://www.cec.org/ files /pdf/sem/ACFA1B.pdf [hereinafter Lake Chapala I
Submission]; Lake Chapala II Submission to the Commission for Environmental
Cooperation Pursuant to Article 14, A14/SEM/03-003/01/SUB (May 15, 2003),
available at http://www.cec.org/files/pdf/sem/O3-3-SUB-s.pdf [hereinafter Lake
Chapala II Submission].
66. Deanna Aguilar, Is the Grass any Greener on the Other Side of the Rio
Grande? A Look at NAFTA and Its Progeny's Effects on Mexican Environmental
Conditions, 10 CURRENTS: INT'L TRADE L.J. 44, 48 (2001).
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lowing the enactment of NAFTA, Mexico began to develop a PRTR.67
Similar registries had been established in the United States and Can-
ada in 1986 and 1993 respectively. 68 At the time the Mexican gov-
ernment committed to developing a PRTR, Mexico largely lacked a
significant domestic civil society constituency dedicated to the issue.69
Consequently, more widespread Mexican civil society involvement
began in large part due to outreach efforts by Mexico's environmental
ministry, the Instituto Nacional de Ecologia (INE), to recruit environ-
mental organizations for a multi-sector national consultative group. 70
Once they had been recruited, Mexican environmental groups took the
initiative to expand the domestic PRTR network.7' Participation in
INE's consultative group facilitated connections between the CEC and
Mexican environmental organizations.72 The CEC supported the work
of Mexican NGOs through financial means as well as through spon-
soring tri-national activities. 73
One major challenge Mexican activists faced in establishing a na-
tional PRTR was to make the registry mandatory for industry. 74 To
accomplish this, Mexican activists went beyond the CEC's coopera-
tive discussion spaces and adopted more confrontational tactics. 75
They mobilized dozens of domestic groups, leveraged international
pressure by collaborating with U.S. and Canadian environmentalists,
67. Talli Nauman, Toward Pollutant Reporting in Mexico: CEC Workshop Re-
veals Progress, TRIO: THE NEWSL. OF THE N. AM. COMMISSION FOR ENVTL.
COOPERATION, Winter 2000-2001, available at http://www.cec.org
/trio/stories/index.cfm?varlan=english &ed=2&ID= 12.
68. Id.
69. Interview with Executive Director of National Environmental NGO in
Mexico City, Mex. (Jan. 25, 2006).
70. Interview with Coordinator of Regional Environmental NGO, in Guadala-
jara, Mex. (Feb. 6, 2006).
71. See Interview with Coordinator of National NGO in Mexico City, Mex.
(Feb. 28, 2006).
72. Id.
73. Interview with Executive Director of National Environmental NGO, supra
note 69.
74. Interview with Coordinator of Regional Environmental NGO, supra note
70.
75. Interview with Executive Director of National Environmental NGO, supra
note 69.
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and utilized the CEC to informally pressure the Mexican govern-
ment.76
The Mexican legislature's approval in December 2001 of a man-
datory PRTR represented a major victory for Mexican activists.77
However, any hopes that a PRTR would soon be implemented quickly
diminished as environmental groups faced increasing government and
industry opposition. 78 PRTR activists continued a variety of tactics to
maintain pressure on the Mexican government. 79 In August 2006, the
government released preliminary data on emissions of toxic chemicals
from over 1,000 industrial facilities in Mexico.8 °
2. Article 13 Report: GM Maize
Over thousands of years, Mexico's indigenous peoples developed
maize through cross-fertilization techniques, and it continues to hold
deep cultural and social significance in Mexico. 8 1 Maize is also a
critical crop for the large number of Mexican subsistence farmers with
small land-holdings. 82  Although the Mexican government banned
GM maize cultivation in 1998, it continued to allow unlabeled GM
maize to be imported from the United States, leading many to specu-
late it would be only a matter of time before GM strains began to ap-
pear. 83 In April 2002, a coalition of twenty-three Mexican civil soci-
ety organizations petitioned the CEC to develop an Article 13 report
76. Interview with Coordinator of International NGO in Mexico City, Mex.
(Dec. 9, 2005).
77. Talli Nauman, Mexican Right-to-Know Boosters Should Build Bridges to
Environmental Disclosure Law (Int'l Rel. Center/Americas Program, Silver City,
N.M.), Apr. 13, 2005, available at http://americas.irc-online.org/am/791.
78. Id.
79. Interview with Coordinator of International NGO, supra note 76.
80. Public Gets First Look at Industrial Pollution in Mexico, CEC LATEST
NEWS (Commission for Environmental Cooperation, Montreal, Can.), Aug. 22,
2006, http://www.cec.org/news/details/index.cfm?varlan=english&ID =2721.
81. See, e.g., Ricardo J. Salvador, Maize, http://maize.agron.iastate.edu/
maizearticle.html.
82. Gisele Henriques & Raj Patel, NAFTA, Corn, and Mexico's Agricultural
Trade Liberalization (Int'l Rel. Center/Americas Program, Silver City, N.M.), Feb.
13, 2004, http://americas.irc-online.org/reports/2004/0402nafta.html.
83. Ivan Noble, Mexican Study Raises GM Concern, BBC NEWS, Nov. 28,
2001, http://news.bbc. co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/1680848.stm.
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on GM maize's environmental impacts on maize biodiversity.8 4 The
coalition included one international NGO (Greenpeace), two national
NGOs, and local groups from Oaxaca, a Mexican state with a rela-
tively large population of indigenous and subsistence farmers and
where GM maize strains had recently been found.85 The case was one
of the CEC's most controversial, attracting an unprecedented level of
civil society involvement and mobilization. 86
One key event in the Article 13 process was the CEC Maize and
Biodiversity Symposium held in Oaxaca. 87 The symposium and an
independent alternative forum organized by local groups attracted
hundreds of participants, including a large number of local grassroots
groups, who presented a variety of perspectives both similar to and
distinct from the original petitioners'. 88 The CEC forum and sur-
rounding civil society protests attracted a high level of local, regional,
national, and even international media attention. 89 The political im-
pact was felt immediately when, a few weeks after the Symposium,
Distribuidora Conasupo, S.A. (DICONSA), a basic foods program of
the Mexican government, stopped distributing GM maize to Oaxaca,
thereby shutting down one major entry point to the region.90 Even af-
ter the Symposium, controversy continued to characterize the Article
13 process. The U.S. government allegedly delayed the CEC report's
publication five months beyond its original release date, and even then
the report was only officially published after Greenpeace had leaked
84. Maize and Biodiversity, supra note 45, at 34-35.
85. Interview with Activist Representative of NGO, in Oaxaca, Mex. (Feb. 15,
2006).
86. Interview with Coordinator of National Environmental NGO, in Mexico
City, Mex. (Mar. 17, 2006).
87. Commission for Environmental Cooperation, Maize and Biodiversity Sym-
posium: The Effects of Transgenic Maize in Mexico, Agenda, Mar. 11, 2004,
http://www.cec.org/files/pdf//AGENDA-Maize-symposium-PublicEN.pdf.
88. Interview with Activist Representative of NGO, supra note 85; Letter from
Commission for Environmental Cooperation, Joint Public Advisory Committee, to
Commission for Environmental Cooperation Council (Apr. 13, 2004),
http://www.cec.org/files/PDF/JPAC/JPAC-Letter-Maize-13-Apr-04-en.pdf (stating
that the maize symposium attracted "several hundred" participants); Interview with
Coordinator of Campesino NGO, in Oaxaca, Mex. (Feb. 15, 2006).
89. Interview with Coordinator of National Environmental NGO, supra note
86.
90. Interview with Coordinator of Campesino NGO, supra note 88.
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its contents to the public. 9 1 Although the U.S. government appended
comments to the report calling it "fundamentally flawed" and unscien-
tific, 92 the report included several recommendations favorable to peti-
tioners, such as minimizing live GM maize imports, requiring GM
maize from the United States to be labeled and sent to mills for proc-
essing, and urging greater supports for traditional agriculture. 93 To
date, the Mexican federal government has failed to implement any of
these recommendations, and civil society groups continue to pursue a
diverse array of strategies in defense of maize.
94
3. Article 14 and 15 Citizen Petition Mechanism: Lake Chapala
Lake Chapala is the largest lake in Mexico and the third largest in
Latin America. 95 Traditionally it was referred to as Mar de Chapala,
or the Chapala Sea. 96 It provides fresh water for over 8 million peo-
ple, is home to hundreds of plant and animal species, and serves as a
critical habitat for migratory birds.97 The lake also faces considerable
threats from over-exploitation and pollution. 98
The first Lake Chapala petition was filed with the CEC in October
1997 by the Instituto de Derecho Ambiental (IDEA), then a recently
formed public interest environmental law firm in Guadalajara. 99 In
91. Greenpeace International, Bush Suppresses GE Crop Warnings: Leaked
Report Acknowledges Genetic Threat (Oct. 18, 2004), http://www.greenpeace.org/
intemational/news/bush-suppresses-ge-crop-warnin#.
92. See Maize and Biodiversity, supra note 45 at 48.
93. Id. at 31, 48.
94. Interview with Coordinator of Regional NGO, in Oaxaca, Mex. (Feb. 17,
2006); Interview with President of Indigenous NGO, in Oaxaca, Mex. (Feb. 16,
2006).
95. See Lake Chapala I Submission, supra note 65.
96. Mexico's Largest Lake on the Verge of Collapse?, GNF NEWSLETTER,
(Global Nature Fund, Radolfzell, Germany), Feb. 2003, at 1, available at
http://www.globalnature.org/bausteine.net/file/showfile.aspx?downdaid=5761 &sp=
E&doid=1011 &fd=2.
97. Tony Burton, Can Mexico's Largest Lake Be Saved?, 23 ECODECISION 68
(1997), available at http://www.mexconnect.com/mex_/travel/tonysarticles/tblguna
saved.html.
98. Interview with Executive Director of National Environmental NGO, supra
note 54.
99. Saving Lake Chapala, E-LAw ADVOCATE (Environmental Law Alliance
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the petition, IDEA alleged that Mexico's environmental protection en-
forcement agency, the Procuradurfa Federal de Protecci6n al Ambi-
ente (PROFEPA), had failed to comply with its procedural require-
ments when, instead of initiating administrative proceedings on a
domestic complaint the petitioners had filed in 1996, it sent the com-
plaint to other government agencies who refused to intervene.100 In
October 1998, the CEC announced it had accepted IDEA's petition.10 1
Approximately one month later, PROFEPA issued a decision rejecting
the petitioners' original 1996 complaint.' 0 2 In July 2000, the CEC de-
termined that based on PROFEPA's decision, it would close the
case. 103
Despite the CEC's decision to dismiss the petition, IDEA and its
collaborators continued to utilize the CEC. They lobbied the JPAC to
take action, and in May 2003 a coalition of nine Lake Chapala area
civil society organizations represented by IDEA filed a second CEC
citizen petition.'0 4 The petition alleged continuing violations by the
Mexican government regarding both the Chapala watershed and the
proposed government-sponsored Arcediano dam, which was to be lo-
cated downstream from the lake.' 05 The CEC accepted the second pe-
tition in December 2003, and after receiving a response from the
Mexican government, announced in May 2005, that it would create a
factual record. 10 6 The petitioners have utilized a variety of tactics to
preserve the watershed and have had some success. In 2004, a Mexi-
Worldwide, Eugene, Or.), Winter, 2004, at 1, www.elaw.org/news/advocate/de
fault.asp?issue=2004- 1.
100. See Lake Chapala I Submission, supra note 65, at 3-5.
101. Letter from Secretariado de la Comisi6n para la Cooperaci6n Ambiental
to Julia Carabias Lillo, SEMARNAP (Oct. 2, 1998), available at
http://www.cec.org/ files/pdf/sem/97-7-DET-So.PDF.
102. Determinaci6n del Secratario en conformidad con el artfculo 15(1) del
Acuerdo de Cooperaci6n Ambiental de Amdrica del Norte [Determinaci6n] [Secre-
tariat Determinatin Not to Issue a Factual Record], A14/SEM/97-007/16/15(l), (Jul.
14, 2000) at 1-2, http://www.cec.org/files/pdf/sem/ ACFA4D.pdf.
103. Id. at 15.
104. Interview with Executive Director of National Environmental NGO, su-
pra note 54.
105. Lake Chapala II Submission, supra note 65.
106. Lake Chapala II Submission Timeline, Commission for Environmental
Cooperation, available at http://www.ec.org/citizen/submissions/details/index.cfm?
varlan=english&ID=90.
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can administrative law judge suspended the government-initiated
Arcediano dam project, and that same year Mexican federal authori-
ties committed $250 million to restore Chapala's water basin. ' 07
C. Data Analysis
This section analyzes interview data from Mexican activists to
identify the secondary consequences of the CEC's participatory
mechanisms on activists' transnational and domestic civil society net-
works, as well as the impacts of these networks on activists' claims-
making. It compares Mexican activists' experiences across the CEC's
different soft law mechanisms to identify these mechanisms' distinct
opportunities and constraints on activists' international and domestic
networking. It then applies this analysis to formulating policy rec-
ommendations on how soft law mechanisms can be structured so as to
foster varying types of civil society engagement.
1. The Impact of the CEC on Transnational Networks
International law scholars researching the CEC and other soft law
mechanisms have generally asserted that these mechanisms have en-
couraged transnational civil society collaboration. 10 8 This assertion
raises, but does not address, the central questions of why, how, and
under what circumstances such collaboration occurs. Given the fre-
quency with which transnational network formation has been high-
lighted by researchers and promoted as a significant counterweight to
globalization's technological and institutional changes,10 9 precious lit-
107. Saving Lake Chapala, supra note 99; Chris Kraul, Mexico: Fight Over
Dam Points Up Water Woes, L.A. TIMES, May 9, 2004, at A5.
108. See, e.g., Gustavo Vega-Canovas, NAFTA and the Environment, 30
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 55, 61 (2001); Kate Andrias, Work in the 21st Century-
A Look at the Contemporary Labor Movement: Gender, Work, and the NAFTA La-
bor Side Agreement, 37 U.S.F. L. REv. 521, 554 (2003); Adelle Blackett, Towards
Social Regionalism in the Americas, 23 CoMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 901, 921 (2002).
109. See, e.g., Peter Evans, Fighting Marginalization with Transnational Net-
works: Counter-Hegemonic Globalization, 29 CONTEMP. Soc. 230, 231 (2000) (ar-
guing that transnational networks form a "globalization from below" that empha-
sizes challenge rather than adaptation, illustrating possibilities for "cumulative
changes that might counteract the inegalitarian consequences of dominant forms of
globalization").
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tle is known about the institutional circumstances under which it is
both most and least likely to emerge.
Mexican activists' experiences with the CEC show that, despite
the emphasis placed on transnational collaboration by researchers,
participation in the CEC does not "necessarily," or even "probably,"
result in activists' transnational collaboration. °10 This section dis-
cusses some of the ways in which the CEC's soft law mechanisms
have provided distinct opportunities and constraints on transnational
collaboration among Mexican civil society actors. It analyzes these
impacts in terms of two processes: transnational framing and the for-
mation of transnational ties between activists.
a. Transnational Framing
Opportunities for activists to develop transnational frames in
which they think about their work in transnational terms are one criti-
cal but potentially overlooked way in which soft law mechanisms can
serve as a critical precursor to the formation of transnational ties. The
extent to which Mexican activists reported transnational frame forma-
tion within the CEC depended in significant part on the institutional
characteristics of the mechanisms in which they were participating.
Those activists reporting the highest levels of transnational frame
formation attributed this to opportunities for dialogue with activists
and representatives from other NAFTA countries. For example, one
activist in the PRTR working group described how discussions with
other group members caused her to view environmental issues in
transnational terms for the first time.11' Another activist described
how merely attending just two JPAC meetings dramatically impacted
the extent to which he viewed his work in transnational terms:
What interests me [about attending JPAC meetings] is that we can
find each other, those of us who don't agree [with what's going on],
who are from other countries .... [I] can get in touch with some-
one... and [that person] can tell me about their [sic] experiences
and with the experiences that we exchange, we return as different
people. I'm not the same.., as when I went to [the JPAC meeting
in] Canada. I know different things. I know how these people have
110. See discussion infra Part III.C.l(a)-(b).
111. Interview with Coordinator of International NGO, supra note 76.
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struggled. I know what interests them .... [My participation in
the JPAC] has been useful.., for me to have a more holistic, a
more global vision. 112
Significantly, both the PRTR and JPAC were institutional spaces
within the CEC that prioritized opportunities for face-to-face interac-
tion between participants. Moreover, each offered relatively low bar-
riers to entry. The PRTR project actively recruited Mexican civil so-
ciety groups to participate, 1 3 and activists can attend a single JPAC
meeting with financial assistance. 114 These lower barriers may result
in the participation of a larger proportion of activists who do not al-
ready possess strong transnational frames, and for whom such an ex-
perience may be potentially transformative.
In contrast, reporting mechanisms like the citizen petition tend to
contribute less directly to transnational identity formation due to the
higher resource demands of preparing and pursuing a legalistic com-
plaint and lack of institutional opportunities for dialogue. They can,
however, offer a useful vehicle to "project" transnational identities.
For example, the citizen petition permits organizations irrespective of
their countries of residence to file claims regarding any of the NAFTA
countries. 15 Because relatively few petitions are filed and accepted,
citizen petitions offer greater visibility to activists than the CEC's co-
operative mechanisms which involve larger numbers of individuals in
more routine activities. According to one activist, a Mexican civil so-
ciety group's involvement in a citizen petition filed against another
NAFFA country can serve as a vehicle to demonstrate that Mexican
civil society "is concerned at a regional and an environmental level,
not just at a very local level, and looking for very direct benefits."11 6
This type of involvement permits Mexican civil society actors to sig-
nal a transnational environmental frame that goes beyond local and
domestic concerns, affecting how such organizations are perceived
112. Interview with Coordinator of Indigenous NGO in Mexico City, Mex.
(Dec. 5, 2005).
113. Interview with Executive Director of National Environmental NGO, su-
pra note 69.
114. Paquin et al., supra note 24, at 3.
115. NAAEC, supra note 3, art. 14(1).
116. Interview with Executive Director of International Environmental NGO,
in Mexico City, Mex. (Nov. 16, 2005).
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both domestically and internationally, as well as potentially facilitat-
ing future collaborations with transnational partners over the long-
term. For example, Lake Chapala activists were able to leverage the
attention brought by their CEC involvement to assist in forming rela-
tionships with other partners, such as the Living Lakes network, an in-
ternational organization based in Germany. 117
Finally, far from contributing to the growth of transnational
frames, under certain circumstances Mexican activists' CEC involve-
ment can lead to the opposite-a reinforcement of local frames and a
rejection of the "global." This is particularly true in institutional
spaces that attract participants who do not already possess transna-
tional frames and offer little opportunities for civil society interaction.
One activist described how attending the 2003 Maize Symposium in
Oaxaca made her realize the CEC was a "deception" and that "the
work that we have to do has to come from us." ' 1 8 Describing the most
disappointing aspects of the meeting, she emphasized its closed dy-
namics and lack of listening or dialogue.' 19 Language barriers and the
highly programmed nature of the event exacerbated these difficulties,
limiting her ability to interact with other activists outside the meet-
ing's formal spaces. 120
In sum, the CEC's various soft law mechanisms offer distinct pos-
sibilities and constraints on transnational frame development. As a
policy matter, mechanisms with lower barriers to entry and more op-
portunities for participant dialogue may increase the likelihood of
forming transnational frames. Mechanisms with the higher costs of
entry associated with legalistic mechanisms and claims-filtering may
play less of a role in frame formation; however, their greater visibility
can offer activists opportunities to project transnational frames to a
wider public.
Cumulatively, these differences suggest that while soft law
mechanisms can contribute to transnational frame formation, such
outcomes are far from inevitable, and policy makers who intend soft
law mechanisms to encourage transnational frame formation should
117. Interview with Executive Director of National Environmental NGO, su-
pra note 54.
118. Interview with Coordinator of Regional NGO, supra note 94.
119. Id.
120. Id.
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pay attention to the opportunities for dialogue and exchange such
mechanisms offer. These differences are reminders of the challenges
of attempting to assess soft law mechanisms' direct and indirect im-
pacts. Since soft law mechanisms may impact how activists perceive
and think about their work, the repercussions may extend well beyond
the CEC to other areas. For example, one PRTR activist noted that, as
a result of her organization's cross-border experiences in the CEC, the
organization continued to utilize transnational strategies even after it
was no longer involved, because "it is very important to carry out
processes that really ... cross borders."' 12 ' For reasons that will be
explored in the following section, Mexican civil society activists have
been able to form long-term, intensive transnational ties through their
work with the CEC only to a limited extent. Given these limitations it
may be that the actual impact of soft law mechanisms like the CEC's
are more pronounced with regards to the formation and signaling of
transnational frames than to the direct formation of new transnational
activist networks. Although such secondary consequences may be dif-
ficult to measure, it is necessary to consider them in order to achieve a
more complete assessment of the soft law mechanisms' actual effects.
b. Formation of Transnational Ties Between Activists
Mexican activists reported high variation in the intensity and du-
ration of transnational activist ties they formed through the CEC. Of
all those interviewed, the only activists that reported forming long-
term, intensive cross-border collaboration through the CEC were
PRTR participants. 122 By contrast, Lake Chapala and GM maize ac-
tivists reported short-term, lower intensity collaboration with a larger
number groups, while activists whose primary institutional vehicle
was the JPAC reported low intensity collaboration with a low number
of groups. 123 Although these experiences do not necessarily reflect
121. Interview with Coordinator of National NGO, supra note 71.
122. Interview with Coordinator of International NGO, supra note 76; Inter-
view with Executive Director of National Environmental NGO, supra note 69; In-
terview with Coordinator of Regional Environmental NGO, supra note 70; Inter-
view with Co-Director of International Environmental NGO, in Aguascalientes,
Mex. (Feb. 7, 2006); Interview with Coordinator of National NGO, supra note 71.
123. Interview with Coordinator of Indigenous NGO, supra note 112; Inter-
view with Staff Attorney of International Environmental NGO, in Mexico City,
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the overall frequency of different transnational collaboration patterns
within the CEC, they show that a wide range of such collaborations
can emerge across different soft law mechanisms in the same institu-
tion. The following analysis identifies two aspects of soft law mecha-
nisms that played a key role in the emergence and nature of transna-
tional collaboration among activists: (1) institutional opportunities for
transnational networking; and (2) the externalization pathway of the
dispute.
i. Availability of Institutional Opportunities for Transnational
Networking
In the words of one PRTR activist, "[1]ook, that [national, tri-
national and international strategy], I didn't make it up. That... was
already a given."'124 By the time Mexican civil society groups were
invited to join the PRTR project, they were entering an institutional
space already shaped by a tri-national superstructure in which the
Mexican government had committed to developing a PRTR.125 This
institutional space offered a number of opportunities to PRTR activists
that facilitated the emergence of transnational activist collaboration in
ways not available to activists involved in other institutional mecha-
nisms within the CEC.
The fact that the PRTR project was a "top-down" effort generated
through diplomatic channels played a key role in generating condi-
tions conducive to cross-border civil society collaboration. In part, it
created political opportunities that offered activists relatively concrete
benefits as a result of transnational participation. First, it facilitated
the initial involvement of Mexican, U.S., and Canadian activists by
Mex. (Dec. 8, 2005); Interview with Activist Representative of NGO, supra note 85;
Interview with Coordinator of Campesino NGO, supra note 88; Interview with Pre-
sident of Indigenous NGO, supra note 94; Interview with Coordinator of Regional
NGO, supra note 94; Interview with Coordinator of National Environmental NGO,
supra note 86; Interview with Executive Director of National Environmental NGO,
in Guadalajara, Mex. (May 17, 2006); Interview with Executive Director of National
Environmental NGO, supra note 54.
124. Interview with Coordinator of Regional Environmental NGO, supra note
70.
125. See Commission for Environmental Cooperation, Pollutant Release and
Transfer Registers, CEC Council Resolution: 00-07 (June 13, 2000) available at
http://www.cec.org/files/PDF/COUNCIJ/00-07eEN.pdf.
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making it seem more likely a PRTR would be developed. 126 By con-
trast, in CEC mechanisms where the outcome is more uncertain be-
cause civil society groups lack firmer prior commitments from na-
tional governments, activists may be reluctant to invest the time and
resources it would take to develop or maintain transnational contacts.
Another way in which Mexico's prior diplomatic commitment fa-
cilitated transnational activism's emergence was by constructing a
substantive overlap between the interests and experiences of U.S., Ca-
nadian, and Mexican groups. Since Mexico had committed to devel-
oping a PRTR comparable to those in the United States and Canada,
the experiences and technical knowledge of U.S. and Canadian groups
became relevant to Mexican groups who were able to use this infor-
mation in their efforts to pressure government and industry.'27 Such
overlap does not always exist in other CEC mechanisms. 128 For ex-
ample, JPAC meetings convene environmental groups on a variety of
themes, and groups in attendance may have little in common in terms
of their substantive focus. 129 In CEC mechanisms that are initiated by
the public, such as the citizen petition, it is largely up to activists
themselves to identify and construct the substantive overlap which
justifies cooperation; and many times they must do so in the absence
of a pre-existing cross-border regulatory framework. 130
Finally, the Mexican national government's prior commitment to
a PRTR made more material and institutional resources available to
civil society groups, which they were able to appropriate for transna-
tional networking. For example, grants from the CEC's now defunct
126. Interview with Coordinator of National NGO, supra note 71.
127. Interview with Executive Director of National Environmental NGO, su-
pra note 69; Interview with Coordinator of Regional Environmental NGO, supra
note 70; Interview with Coordinator of International NGO, supra note 76.
128. See supra Part II (discussing Article 13, citizen petitions, and JPAC).
129. For a complete listing of registered attendees and topics of discussion at
JPAC meetings see Commission for Environmental Cooperation, Who We Are-Joint
Public Advisory Committee-Records of Discussion, http://www.cec.org/who we-are
/jpac/discussions/index.cfm?varlan=english.
130. Richard J. Ansson, Jr., The North American Agreement on Environmental
Protection and the Arctic Council Agreement: Will These Multinational Agreements
Adequately Protect the Environment?, 29 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 101, 126 (1998) (noting
that the NAAEC "failed to provide a forum whereby the three countries could de-
velop standards to prevent transboundary environmental degradation"); Interview
with Executive Director of International Environmental NGO, supra note 116.
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North American Fund for Environmental Cooperation (NAFEC) en-
couraged cross-border PRTR proposals, and funding from the Mexi-
can government allowed domestic groups to expand into this new is-
sue area. 131 Activists from the three NAFTA countries were also
funded to attend CEC meetings, 132 resulting in semi-regular transna-
tional networking opportunities. Other CEC mechanisms do not offer
similar material or institutional supports. Article 13 and the citizen
petition process do not regularly convene public meetings, 33 and
while, in theory, the JPAC offers activists an opportunity to meet on
an ongoing basis, in practice, the irregularity and uncertainty of finan-
cial assistance undermines activists' ability to sustain their participa-
tion and contacts. 134
However, these factors alone do not fully explain why such a high
degree of transnational collaboration occurred among PRTR activists.
If these factors fully explained this collaboration, one would expect
transnational contacts between activists to have been established rela-
tively early on, though this was not the case. To understand why
transnational activism emerged when it did, it is necessary to also con-
sider a second set of factors that reflect the specific opportunities of-
fered by the CEC's participatory spaces.
One PRTR activist described the pivotal shift that occurred during
a 2003 CEC meeting, which led to an intensification of tri-national
collaboration:
[T]he groups from the three [countries were] very upset because the
Mexican PRTR wasn't coming out, and it seemed like it was going
to keep on... getting put off and put off.... Then when... [we]
saw that the Canadians and the U.S. groups were also angry-
naturally we began to get together and plan a meeting inside the
meeting. [Two activists, one from the United States and one from
Canada] ... said, "well, why don't we get together and meet in my
organization's office [which happened to be near the CEC meet-
ing], to see how we can make the CEC pressure the Mexican gov-
131. See, e.g., Interview with Executive Director of National Environmental
NGO, supra note 69.
132. Interview with Co-Director of International Environmental NGO, supra
note 122.
133. See supra Part II.A-B.
134. See, e.g., Interview with Coordinator of Regional Environmental NGO,
supra note 70.
31
Longiaru: The Secondary Consequences of International Institutions: A Case
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2006
94 CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 37
ernment more so that finally the PRTR regulations will come
out." 
135
While the backing of national governments might have created the
potential for transnational activism to emerge, this anecdote illustrates
that such collaboration did not begin to take root until one critical
moment-when activists witnessed, in person, one another's anger
with a common target, the Mexican government. The experience
highlights the importance of what might be described as the experien-
tial aspects of activism, which can often get lost in discussions of ra-
tional interests. While such intangible experiences may seem to be the
result of mere fortuitousness, international institutions can play a role
in increasing the likelihood that such opportunities will occur. Mexi-
can activists' experiences suggest two aspects of soft law mecha-
nisms' participatory dynamics that support the emergence of transna-
tional collaboration: (1) opportunities for activists to participate in
cross-border spaces that convene actors from different sectors (espe-
cially those with "opposing" interests), and (2) opportunities for activ-
ists to engage in relationship-building in independent spaces with one
another.
Institutional spaces that convene actors across different sectors are
important because they offer opportunities for activists divided by ge-
ography, history, and culture to share experiences of opposition by a
common target and provide a concrete experiential basis for solidarity.
While such multi-sector spaces are often established to promote coop-
erative dialogue between sectors, it may be that a certain level of
''non-cooperation" contributes to pushing activists to incur the costs of
overcoming barriers to transnational collaboration. It may be that in
dialogue-based soft law mechanisms, whose non-binding nature offers
little real incentive for powerful actors to make concessions, this out-
come might be a more common (though unintended) effect.
At the same time, the possibility of transnational collaboration
largely depends on activists' ability to take advantage of moments like
the experience that the PRTR activist described. 136 This raises an im-
portant additional factor for transnational network formation-the
availability of spaces for activists to strengthen their relationships with
135. Interview with Co-Director of International Environmental NGO, supra
note 122.
136. Id.
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one another. The CEC's PRTR meetings offered activists opportuni-
ties to meet for several days each year.1 37 Activists pressured the CEC
to provide rooms, equipment, and scheduling accommodations so they
could hold their own meetings before official PRTR events, after
which they maintained contact through telephone and email. 138 In one
Mexican activist's words, "[t]his work [of getting to know environ-
mental groups from other NAFFA countries], isn't only attributable to
the CEC, but also to the [environmental] organizations. We de-
manded spaces from the Commission. ,139
Together, the factors in the PRTR case illustrate the number and
depth of institutional supports that may be necessary for soft law
mechanisms to foster new transnational ties. In contrast to unitary
theories of "globalization from below," these experiences show how
"top down" actions by international institutions and national govern-
ments can play a critical role in facilitating "bottom up" transnational
networks' emergence. Mexican activists' experiences also illustrate
the many obstacles activists must overcome to generate transnational
ties. Merely establishing tri-national institutional spaces such as the
JPAC will not necessarily result in strong transnational relationships.
Often, the leverage civil society groups gain from soft law mecha-
nisms is simply too limited to justify the resource investment neces-
sary to form strong transnational ties. One implication of these find-
ings is that, to the extent that transnational collaboration emerges
through supports and opportunities provided by soft law mechanisms,
such supports may be important in sustaining that collaboration. For
example, changes in national governments' priorities in recent years
have diminished the PRTR projects' resources, causing activists to re-
duce the intensity of their transnational collaboration. 140 Such find-
ings however do not account for the fact that many Mexican activists,
who were members of well-developed, long-standing transnational
networks, nonetheless chose to limit their engagement with those net-
137. Id.
138. Id.; Interview with Coordinator of Regional Environmental NGO, supra
note 70.
139. Interview with Coordinator of International NGO, supra note 76.
140. Interview with Coordinator of Regional Environmental NGO, supra note
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works in their CEC work. The next section discusses this phenome-
non.
ii. Externalization Pathway of the Dispute
One common civil society motivation for participating in interna-
tional institutions like the CEC is to externalize disputes, bringing
them from domestic to international arenas. 14' This section explores
how different soft law pathways for externalizing disputes can affect
activists' opportunities for transnational collaboration. In the case of
Mexican activists and the CEC, a significant difference existed be-
tween mechanisms that externalized disputes primarily through the
government's own actions (such as the PRTR project) and those
mechanisms which externalized disputes primarily through activists'
own initiative (such as the Lake Chapala and GM maize petitions).
One reason for this difference between the two types of mecha-
nisms is that Mexican activists bringing sensitive domestic issues to
international arenas reported concerns of making themselves vulner-
able to politically damaging accusations of having facilitated foreign
interference in Mexican affairs. 14 2 Consequently, many Mexican ac-
tivists carefully avoided the appearance of collaborating too closely
with transnational partners. 143 For example, in one citizen petition,
even though a Mexican activist group already had extensive contacts
with a U.S. group that had provided technical assistance, the Mexican
group decided against having the U.S. group sign the petition:
We didn't want to give an opening above all at the state ... or
even at the federal level to start saying that there had been foreign
interference in such an important and controversial case .... [W]e
would have to be careful that the authorities wouldn't use [non-
Mexican groups' support] against us, to say that there's foreign in-
terference, and say, "[W]e're the ones who must decide what gets
done [in our state] !" ..... So we said, well .... do we want the issue
141. TARROW, supra note 4, at 145.
142. See, e.g., Interview with Executive Director of National Environmental
NGO, supra note 54; Interview with Coordinator of Campesino NGO, supra note
88.
143. See, e.g., Interview with Executive Director of National Environmental
NGO, supra note 54; Interview with Activist Representative of NGO, supra note 85.
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being discredited like that? 14
4
Similar actions were reported by other Mexican activists. 45 Petition-
ers in the Article 13 GM maize case declined to have foreign groups
sign their petition.146 Instead, they used their already-existing interna-
tional networks and the controversy's high profile to recruit over
ninety foreign organizations to send letters of support to the CEC, urg-
ing that it accept the case.147 Once the CEC did so, these groups' in-
volvement nearly ceased. Similarly, in the Lake Chapala case, al-
though petitioners decided against having U.S. and Canadian groups
sign their petition, they used JPAC meetings to organize letters of
support from U.S. and Canadian groups. 148 In both instances, instead
of seeking out high-profile collaboration with foreign groups, activists
sought out lower-intensity collaborations in which no one foreign
group could be identified as particularly "involved." Concerns of for-
eign interference accusations were well-founded. 149 In a somewhat
notorious example, in response to the first petition filed against the
Mexican government, Mexico's environmental minister made wide-
spread and damaging accusations in the press that one high-profile
Mexican activist had been paid off and was being directed by foreign
interests. 150
In contrast, in cases like the PRTR project where the dispute was
primarily externalized through the government's own actions, activists
felt fewer constraints on engaging in more intense and public transna-
144. Interview with Executive Director of National Environmental NGO, su-
pra note 54.
145. Interview with Activist Representative of NGO, supra note 85.
146. Id.
147. Interview with Staff Attorney of International Environmental NGO, supra
note 123; Interview with Coordinator of National Environmental NGO, supra note
86.
148. Interview with Executive Director of National Environmental NGO, su-
pra note 54.
149. See Fernando Bejarano, Mexico-U.S. Environmental Partnerships, in
CROSS-BORDER DIALOGUES: U.S.-MEXICO SOCIAL MOVEMENT NETWORKING, supra
note 20, at 113, 129 (noting that Mexican authorities often try to delegitimize local
environmental struggles by suggesting that there are hidden party interests at play,
thereby undermining the social cohesion of the affected group).
150. Interview with Director of National Environmental NGO, in Mexico City,
Mex. (Dec. 14, 2005).
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tional collaboration. 151 One PRTR activist described Mexican groups'
decision-making process regarding whether to intensify their collabo-
ration with U.S. and Canadian groups:
[W]e even discussed, well, how is this [cross-border collaboration]
going to be seen? Whether. .. as foreign involvement in Mexican
affairs or if we have to see it as something natural-you're inside a
trade agreement. We discussed it between ourselves. We agreed
that we had to open up and that this was a way to become
stronger ... because ... we were going to have ... more of an in-
ternational presence. 152
Since activists perceived that the Mexican government's role in exter-
nalizing the PRTR issue through its trade commitments lessened the
risk of foreign interference accusations, they determined it would be
strategically beneficial to engage in more in-depth transnational col-
laboration. 153 Consequently, they coordinated actions, shared infor-
mation and resources, and developed common strategies and plat-
forms. 154 Far from triggering accusations of foreign interference, the
transnational strategy met with a certain degree of success.1 55 It en-
hanced Mexican groups' credibility and launched a period in which
government officials became more responsive to activists. '56
Differences between the strategic costs and benefits of cross-
border collaboration as a result of soft law mechanisms' externaliza-
tion pathways have several implications. First, the importance of do-
mestic political culture in mediating these mechanisms' impacts sug-
gests that activists' willingness to engage in transnational networks
within soft law mechanisms will vary across domestic settings, imply-
ing the need for greater sensitivity to domestic context as well as the
need for more place-based, empirical research. Second, while some
151. Interview with Co-Director of International Environmental NGO, supra
note 122.
152. Id.
153. See id.
154. See, e.g., Interview with Coordinator of International NGO, supra note
76; Interview with Co-Director of International Environmental NGO, supra note
122.
155. Interview with Co-Director of International Environmental NGO, supra
note 122.
156. Id.
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legal researchers have tended to highlight the benefits transnational
collaboration offers in the context of international soft law mecha-
nisms, 157 relatively little attention has been paid to its potential
costs. 158 Mexican activists' experiences highlight the presence of a
more complex political terrain in which high-profile intensive transna-
tional collaboration is not always beneficial, offering insight into why
activists may not pursue certain transnational strategies even if they
are theoretically available to them. It may be that, in circumstances
where the threat of foreign interference accusations is significant, soft
law mechanisms that are more cooperative and dialogue-based are
more conducive to promoting overt transnational collaboration than
soft law mechanisms which place domestic activists more explicitly
and directly in opposition to their domestic governments.
Finally, Mexican activists' experiences with the constraints on
transnational activism in the CEC offer evidence for the assertion that
transnational activism is not a necessary or even likely outcome of all
international institutions' public participation mechanisms. It suggests
that specific institutional mechanisms must offer opportunities suffi-
ciently attractive to induce activists to incur the significant cost of en-
gaging in transnational ties. The possibilities and contours of the
transnational public sphere-to the extent that such a space may ever
exist-are particular, indeterminate, and contingent. Far from inevi-
table, they are being constructed one space at a time.
157. See, e.g., Blackett, supra note 108, at 965 (stating that the need for social
regionalism in the Americas is "likely to grow, and with it, trans-governmental and
trans-border civil society coalitions that are likely to deepen will repeatedly expose
the deficiencies of trade"); Graubart, supra note 44, at 434 (inquiring whether
groups submitting CEC citizen petitions are "assembling cross-border coalitions of
co-submitters to increase the appeal and visibility of the complaint"); David M.
Trubek et al., Transnationalism in the Regulation of Labor Relations: International
Regimes and Transnational Advocacy Networks, 25 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 1187,
1194 (2000) (arguing that "[t]he real key to the transnational vision is the belief that
through the continued operation of networks linking various actors across borders, a
number of overlapping normative arenas can be mobilized to create an effective
regulatory mosaic").
158. See John A. Guidry et al., Globalizations and Social Movements, in
GLOBALIZATIONS & SOCIAL MOVEMENTS: CULTURE, POWER, AND THE
TRANSNATIONAL PUBLIC SPHERE 1, 23 (John A. Guidry et al. eds., 2000) (stating the
importance of recognizing that "the existing transnational public sphere is much
more fractured, potentially exclusive, and power laden than our projects of liberal
hope ... might wish").
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2. The Impact of the CEC on Domestic Ties Between Activists
In comparison to the emphasis on transnational networks in much
research on international institutions, relatively little attention has
been paid to these institutions' impact on activists' domestic networks
and relationships. 5 9 This may be due in part to the ongoing influence
of traditional boundaries between the study of international and do-
mestic politics. However, there is an increasing consensus that as a
consequence of globalization and its processes, the boundaries be-
tween these two domains are becoming more fluid. 160
Given the barriers that continue to hinder the emergence and de-
velopment of transnational networks, at least in some instances the
secondary consequences of international soft law mechanisms like the
CEC's may be more significant with regards to activists' domestic
ties. In fact, many Mexican activists reported greater success in ex-
panding their domestic ties through the CEC. 16 1 These ties ranged
from short-term mobilizations around a single, high-profile interna-
tional event,162 to long-term information exchange networks and more
intensive campaign coalitions.163 The following sections focus on the
159. See generally id. at 4, 14 (arguing that "[a]n analytical focus on the trans-
national can distract us from the significance of the local in transforming globaliza-
tion itself' and that "far from emphasizing the disappearance of locality that is im-
plied in much writing on globalization ... globalization helps create locality").
160. See generally RAJAGOPAL, supra note 14, at 270 (2003) (suggesting that
sites of resistance can no longer be understood as "global" or as within the catego-
ries of the "nation state" and that rather, in this new image of international order,
there are particular enclaves of the "international" that exist in different locations);
Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Legal Process, 75 NEB. L. REV. 181, 183-84
(1996) (describing how the concept of transnational legal process breaks down tradi-
tional dichotomies between the international and the domestic realms that have his-
torically dominated the study of international law).
161. See, e.g., Interview with Executive Director of National Environmental
NGO, supra note 54; Interview with Executive Director of National Environmental
NGO, supra note 123; Interview with Coordinator of National Environmental NGO,
supra note 86; Interview with Staff Attorney of International Environmental NGO,
supra note 123; Interview with Activist Representative of NGO, supra note 85; In-
terview with Coordinator of Campesino NGO, supra note 88.
162. See, e.g., Interview with Coordinator of National Environmental NGO,
supra note 86.
163. See, e.g., Interview with Executive Director of National Environmental
NGO, supra note 54.
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secondary consequences that the CEC and its soft law mechanisms
have had on Mexican activists' domestic ties.
a. Formation of Long-Term Domestic Ties and Their Impact on
Claims-Making
One of the most significant secondary consequences Mexican ac-
tivists reported as a result of their CEC involvement was the formation
and strengthening of long-term domestic ties. Activists who reported
the greatest impacts on long-term ties were intensely involved with the
CEC on a single, well-defined issue. 164 These activists employed mul-
tiple strategies to leverage their CEC involvement to assist their out-
reach and recruitment of long-term domestic civil society allies. 165
These allies' long-term collaboration later shaped both how activists
presented their claims and how those claims were received in the do-
mestic and international arenas. 166 Using the PRTR and the Lake
Chapala cases as examples, the following analysis discusses the for-
mation of long-term domestic ties and the impact of those long-term
ties on activists' claims-making.
i. Formation of Long-Term Domestic Ties
The Lake Chapala and PRTR cases illustrate how Mexican activ-
ists who were closely involved with the CEC on a well-defined issue
were able to leverage their involvement to assist in forming long-term
domestic networks dedicated to that issue. For example, Lake Cha-
pala activists used the citizen process to help form two civil society
coalitions, each of which roughly corresponded to the two CEC peti-
tions. 1 67 These coalitions engaged in legal, media, and grassroots ac-
tivities, and expanded their involvement to a variety of political arenas
164. See, e.g., id.; Interview with Executive Director of National Environ-
mental NGO, supra note 69; Interview with Co-Director of International Environ-
mental NGO, supra note 122; Interview with Coordinator of National NGO, supra
note 71.
165. See infra Part III.C.2.a.i.
166. See infra Part III.C.2.a.ii.
167. Interview with Executive Director of National Environmental NGO, su-
pra note 54.
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that extended beyond the scope of the original petition.168 PRTR
groups also established a long-term network that was primarily en-
gaged in information and resource exchange, as well as occasional
mobilizing efforts. 169 In both cases, activists were able to utilize CEC
involvement as a way to support their outreach and recruitment. 1
70
Activists employed several strategies to facilitate their domestic out-
reach efforts.
First and foremost, Lake Chapala and PRTR activists generated
interest in their work by using the reputation and legitimacy their or-
ganizations gained through intensive CEC involvement. Lake Cha-
pala activists reported a long period during which they had been at-
tempting to bring Lake Chapala to greater public attention in Mexico
to no avail, 17 including filing domestic complaints at a national level
against the Mexican government. 172 Consequently, activists' main
motivation for filing a CEC citizen petition was to generate interest in
Lake Chapala at the domestic, rather than international level:
One of the strategies was that this case must be taken to the interna-
tional level to make it visible at the level of the whole country ....
This was the main reason because we saw that maybe [the CEC pe-
tition] would do well, maybe it wouldn't.., but what was impor-
tant.., was that [the issue of] Chapala came to light in the country,
and began to be a national theme.
173
Widespread domestic media attention following the first and second
CEC petitions caused Lake Chapala activists to be invited by other
Mexican groups to speak at their events and to network and build alli-
ances with them. 17' This publicity also helped Lake Chapala activists
conduct outreach with local groups, presenting the petition in an at-
168. Id.
169. Interview with Executive Director of National Environmental NGO, su-
pra note 69; Interview with Co-Director of International Environmental NGO, supra
note 122.
170. See, e.g., Interview with Coordinator of National Environmental NGO,
supra note 71.
171. Interview with Executive Director of National Environmental NGO, su-
pra note 54.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
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tractive manner in which groups could collaborate around a concrete
goal. 17 5 Ultimately, even though the CEC dismissed the first petition,
activists considered it successful because they were able to use the
process to expand their domestic networks. 7 6 Mexican groups in the
CEC's PRTR project were also able to leverage the high profile of
their international involvement to enhance their domestic network-
ing.177 One activist who played a key role in the PRTR coalition's
domestic outreach efforts described how links formed with U.S. and
Canadian groups during CEC meetings allowed her to use those
groups' experiences to motivate potential domestic participants:
The positive part [of having networked in the CEC with U.S. and
Canadian groups] . . . is sharing experiences that encouraged Mexi-
can organizations to achieve a PRTR. When we see that the regis-
tries are functioning in the U.S. and in Canada... that was very
encouraging .... Because having a concrete element, having a
concrete demonstration that a registry was functioning, was the
most effective way to invite Mexican organizations to get involved
in all this [PRTR] work. 178
Both the Lake Chapala and PRTR cases illustrate how Mexican
activists were frequently able to more readily and successfully use in-
ternational venues for domestic networking than for transnational
networking. 79 For example, in the PRTR case, Mexican groups first
used CEC meetings as opportunities to independently network among
themselves. 180 Only later did those gatherings among domestic actors
become a "template" for collaboration with U.S. and Canadian activ-
ists. 81 Mexican PRTR activists were also able to expand the domestic
network of organizations focusing on the PRTR beyond the original
175. Interview with Executive Director of National Environmental NGO, su-
pra note 123.
176. Id.
177. Interview with Coordinator of National NGO, supra note 71.
178. Id.
179. See, e.g., Interview with Co-Director of International Environmental
NGO, supra note 122; Interview with Executive Director of National Environmental
NGO, supra note 54.
180. Interview with Co-Director of International Environmental NGO, supra
note 122.
181. Id.
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core of CEC groups in ways they were not able to achieve with their
transnational collaborators.' 82 Lake Chapala activists also reported
having an easier time interacting and networking with other Mexican
groups during CEC meetings.183 For example, during JPAC meetings,
informal socializing and relationship-formation more readily took
place among Mexican activists than between Mexican, U.S., and Ca-
nadian activists, due to the absence of language and cultural barri-
ers.' 84  Lake Chapala activists were also more readily able to
strengthen relationships made from initial contacts with Mexican
groups at JPAC meetings due to the greater ease in maintaining con-
tact with one another.1
85
In sum, in several instances activists who were closely involved
with the CEC were able to use their involvement to facilitate outreach
and recruitment to organizations that were sufficiently similar to form
a basis for long-term collaboration. The extent to which these activ-
ists were able to more readily form long-term domestic, as opposed to
transnational, networks suggests that some of these international insti-
tutions' most significant secondary consequences may be taking place
primarily in domestic rather than international arenas. If this is the
case, a thorough understanding of the effects of international laws and
institutions may require greater attention to domestic political spaces,
and to the dynamic relationship between domestic and international
venues. As will be shown in the following section, attention to these
dynamics is critical for assessing the relationship between interna-
tional institutions' secondary consequences and activists' claims-
making.
ii. Impact of Long-Term Domestic Ties on Claims-Making
Using the PRTR and Lake Chapala cases as examples, this section
explores how repeated and intensive interactions brought about by the
long-term domestic ties activists formed through the CEC impacted
activists' claims-making. The discussion of the PRTR case highlights
182. Id.
183. Interview with Executive Director of National Environmental NGO, su-
pra note 54.
184. Id.
185. Id.
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how long-term domestic ties can play a critical role in filtering and
transforming claims as they pass from the international to the domes-
tic arenas, while the discussion of Lake Chapala highlights how long-
term domestic ties can impact the domestic claims activists bring for-
ward to the international arena.
Mexican PRTR activists' experiences illustrate how long-term
domestic ties formed through the CEC can significantly transform the
application of international claims to the domestic arena in at least
three ways. First, domestic ties formed through the CEC facilitated
knowledge and information sharing between Mexican activists, allow-
ing activists to adapt the internationally developed concept of the
PRTR to domestic contexts. For example, Mexican activists were
able to tailor some of the approaches of U.S. and Canadian groups' ac-
tivism around the PRTR issue to the distinct realities of Mexico's in-
dustrial sector with its much greater proportion of small- and medium-
sized businesses.1 8
6
Second, long-term domestic ties formed through the CEC im-
pacted Mexican PRTR activists' claims by facilitating the develop-
ment of a larger domestic constituency in support of a PRTR. Mexi-
can activists were able to strategically frame the PRTR for a domestic
audience by placing it in the context of locally-based struggles against
industrial pollution. 187 Through these outreach efforts, Mexican activ-
ists formed a much larger network, which included dozens of
groups.' 88 This network played a key role in one of the campaign's
major victories, domestic legislation authorizing a mandatory PRTR,
demonstrating the importance of domestic networks in the implemen-
tation of international commitments and norms. 189
Finally, long-term domestic ties formed through the CEC led to
the expansion and, in some cases, transformation of the PRTR claim
186. Interview with Coordinator of Regional Environmental NGO, supra note
70.
187. Interview with Coordinator of National NGO, supra note 71.
188. Id.; see also Nauman, supra note 77 (noting that dozens of groups were
brought together for the mobilization that achieved PRTR legislative reform in
2001).
189. See generally, Talli Nauman, Mexican Congress Passes Environmental
Reform Package (INT'L REL. CENTERIAMERICAS PROGRAM, SILVER CITY, N.M.),
Jan. 30, 2002, available at http://www.americaspolicy.org/articles/2002/
020lenv.html (last visited Dec. 2, 2006).
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itself. In some instances, domestic activists multiplied the political
arenas in which PRTR claims were brought, for example by pushing
for PRTRs at the local and state levels, in addition to the federal
level.190 In other instances, domestic activists reframed the PRTR's
conceptual framework to extend it to other substantive areas. 191 One
Mexican activist described how her organization used its PRTR in-
volvement in the CEC to expand its domestic work into broader right-
to-know issues:
[Participating in the CEC's PRTR activities] gave us a cause .... It
began by being a very small cause, a pollutant registry, and over the
years it became one of the pillars of the organization's activities.
Beyond a pollutant registry, today the organization's access to in-
formation program is enormous, it includes the pollutant registry,
participation . . . in a coalition for transparency, participation in
an... access project, . . . [collaboration with international partners,
working at a regional level in Latin America to promote access to
environmental issues][The CEC] put the seed of this issue into our
organization. 192
In comparison with the PRTR example, in the Lake Chapala case
long-term domestic ties formed between activists highlight the impor-
tant role newly emergent domestic networks played in transforming
domestic claims brought to an international level. One striking exam-
ple can be seen in how the long-term domestic ties formed by activists
as a result of the first CEC petition impacted the framing of claims be-
fore the CEC in the second petition.
The two Lake Chapala petitions offer a series of stark contrasts
that illustrate this process. For example, Mexican activists report that
the first CEC petition was filed in a somewhat "isolated" manner, hav-
ing been signed by only one petitioner, IDEA-a relatively new pub-
lic interest environmental law firm based in Guadalajara.193 By the
time it filed the second CEC petition, IDEA had used the first petition
190. Interview with Co-Director of International Environmental NGO, supra
note 122.
191. Interview with Executive Director of National Environmental NGO, su-
pra note 69.
192. Id.
193. Interview with Executive Director of National Environmental NGO, su-
pra note 54.
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to strengthen its domestic networks,' 94 and as a result, the second peti-
tion was signed by a coalition of nine environmental groups and grass-
roots associations' 95 Differences are also evident in the two petitions'
content. Perhaps not surprisingly, the first petition was fundamentally
legalistic, highlighting a detailed narrative of procedural violations
and ending with a traditional request for specific relief.' 96  In the
words of one activist it was "a little bit more based on experiences as a
lawyer in Mexico .... [Its] main goal... was to display lack of com-
pliance with Mexican law .... [and lack of] technical and legal con-
sistency."' 97 In contrast, the second petition placed greater emphasis
on substantive environmental harms, such as misdistribution of water
and health threats to local residents.1 98 It also more explicitly framed
its arguments in political terms, concluding with a public declaration
by the petitioning civil society groups. 199 The declaration places the
petition squarely in the context of the groups' previous efforts to po-
litically pressure the CEC and,, stepping out of conventional legal ar-
gument, vividly evoked the consequences of the CEC's inaction:
As a corollary, the signing Mexican organizations want to place
special emphasis on the fact that in several meetings and petitions
we have come to this institution for the purpose of contributing to
saving Lake Chapala, and up until this very day we have felt an
ambiguous position with respect to one of the most important wa-
tersheds in the country. Today once again we put in your hands
water for 23 million Mexicans, the health of the residents of Jua-
nacatlan and Salto, the salvation of Lake Chapala from disappear-
ance, and the salvation of the migratory birds living along the
length of the watershed and Lake Chapala itself, which now find
themselves in serious danger of disappearing. Let's give Lake
Chapala a chance. 200
194. Id.
195. Lake Chapala II Submission, supra note 65, at 14-15.
196. Lake Chapala I Submission, supra note 65.
197. Interview with Executive Director of National Environmental NGO, su-
pra note 54.
198. Lake Chapala II Submission, supra note 65.
199. Id. at 14-15.
200. Id. at 14.
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Activists describe several ways in which the expansion of IDEA's
long-term domestic network between the first and second petitions
contributed to differences between the two petitions. First, because by
the time of the second petition IDEA had more ties to local residents
and organizations directly affected by threats to the Chapala water-
shed, substantive claims were brought to IDEA's attention that might
not have been otherwise. 201 Second, once those claims were raised,
IDEA was in a stronger position to bring them because a greater num-
ber of organizations could assist in documenting the information nec-
essary to bring such claims forward.20 2 Third, IDEA's ties to a larger
number of domestic groups enabled it to engage in strategies not
available in the first petition. For example, one of IDEA's strategies
in the second petition was to "personalize" the environmental harm by
highlighting the hardship of Guadalupe Lara, a signatory on the sec-
ond petition and the sole resident remaining in a village slated to be
flooded for the government-sponsored Arcediano dam. 20 3 According
to activists, the publicity and media attention they were able to bring
to Ms. Lara's plight played a key role in maintaining the pressure of
the second petition on the Mexican government.20 4 Finally, the ex-
pansion of IDEA's long-term domestic networks ultimately contrib-
uted to the second petition's greater "success" of being approved for
the development of a factual record in the sense that, because the sec-
ond petition was grounded in substantive violations rather than proce-
dural ones, it was more difficult for the Mexican government to render
the petition moot through procedural formalities. 2
0 5
Together, the PRTR and Lake Chapala cases demonstrate how
long-term domestic ties facilitated by activists' CEC involvement can
impact activists' claims-making. This can occur by adapting and
transforming international claims brought to the domestic arena, as in
the PRTR case, and by affecting the framing of domestic claims in the
201. Interview with Executive Director of National Environmental NGO, su-
pra note 69.
202. Id.
203. Interview with Executive Director of National Environmental NGO, su-
pra note 54.
204. Id.
205. Secretariat Notification to Council under Article 15(1), A14/SEM-
003/45/ADV, (May 18, 2005) available at http://www.cec.org/files/pdf/sem/O3-3-
ADV-en.pdf.
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international arena, as in the Lake Chapala case. These examples
show how the impact of international institutions on activists' claims
can extend beyond the primary consequences of their substantive and
procedural legal requirements to also include secondary consequences
on activists' networking. An assessment of both types of conse-
quences may be essential to fully understand the relationship between
soft law mechanisms and civil society actors, as well as to fully under-
stand such mechanisms' potential impact and effectiveness. Finally,
while the foregoing analysis has concentrated on how activists' ongo-
ing interactions in the context of long-term domestic ties can impact
activists' claims-making, short-term ties can also have distinct, but no
less significant impacts.
b. Formation of Short-Term Domestic Ties and Their Impact on
Claims-Making
In comparison to CEC mechanisms which require more intensive
involvement by civil society actors over a substantial period of time,
relatively high-profile, "one-time" events open to the public offer op-
portunities for short-term engagement. Such events do not rely on the
outreach and recruitment efforts of those groups already most inten-
sively involved in the CEC to as great an extent. Instead, the event's
high profile can offer incentives to civil society participants to organ-
ize and mobilize in decentralized streams. Generally, the temporary
convergence of interests leading to short-term mobilizations means
participating groups lack common bases for collective identity, and
their collective involvement tends not to last beyond the event it-
self.206 However, this very lack of common identity can open partici-
pation to a wider variety of groups, including those that are unable or
unwilling to engage with international institutions over the long-term.
Using the CEC's 2004 Maize Symposium as an example, the follow-
ing sections discuss first, how soft law mechanisms' high-profile
events can contribute to the short-term mobilization of a more diverse
array of domestic participants; and second, how this larger but short-
term domestic mobilization can impact activists' claims-making.
206. TARROW, supra note 4, at 168.
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i. Formation of Short-Term Domestic Ties
The CEC's 2004 Maize Symposium represents perhaps the most
significant example of a large scale short-term domestic civil society
mobilization in the CEC's history. 20 7 As a high-profile event on a
controversial issue, it attracted hundreds of participants: "[T]here were
rivers of people .... There were all kinds of interventions - indige-
nous, campesino, students, scientists, and environmental NGOs. It
was very varied. It was very rich., 20 8 One of the Symposium's most
notable aspects was the extent to which it attracted local and domestic
groups with no CEC experience who did not normally participate in
international institutions. 20 9 The reasons for these organizations' lack
of engagement with international institutions were not exclusively at-
tributable to a lack of information and resources. Many local groups
who most actively mobilized around the Symposium were openly
skeptical of international institutions like the CEC and were not inter-
ested in becoming involved on a long-term basis. One representative
of a local organization explained:
[S]ince many years ago, my personal effort, the basic thing I have
insisted on, is not to be from the "top" but to be here, "from the bot-
tom," to be with people, not with institutions .... [W]e used [the
CEC] for our own purposes. Before, during, and after
the... CEC's meeting, I still think it doesn't serve for anything.
210
Interviews with Mexican activists involved in the mobilization
around the Symposium offer insight into why, even if groups remain
dubious of an international institution's inherent value, they may
nonetheless choose to participate. Because very few organizations
have the resources to engage with international institutions over the
long-term, understanding such short-term engagements is critical for
more fuilly assessing civil society involvement in international institu-
207. Interview with Staff Attorney of International Environmental NGO, supra
note 123.
208. Interview with Coordinator of National Environmental NGO, supra note
86.
209. See, e.g., Interview with Staff Attorney of International Environmental
NGO, supra note 123; Interview with Coordinator of Campesino NGO, supra note
88; Interview with President of Indigenous NGO, supra note 94.
210. Interview with Coordinator of Campesino NGO, supra note 88.
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tions. In this case, many activists attributed their participation not to
the opportunity to offer their input to an international body, but to
secondary consequences, such as: greater visibility; greater legitimacy
vis-a-vis local networks; and greater access to local and national deci-
sion-makers.211
International events offer valuable opportunities for local activists
to make their work more visible. One activist described why a local
coalition decided to make a public forum they had been independently
organizing coincide with the Maize Symposium:
Fundamentally, [it was] for the public impact, for the media im-
pact .... [W]e... invaded the Commission and... we created an
incident. This served to. .. "generate news," to achieve public out-
reach and.., public diffusion of our position .... [I]t was a way in
which we used the [CEC], we used it for our purposes. 212
The independent forum, "The Forum in Defense of Our Maize" ("El
Foro en Defensa de Nuestro Maiz"), was held one day before the
Symposium and attracted over 100 participants. 213 Direct actions in-
cluded marches, press conferences, and a protest in which participants
distributed native maize tortillas.214 All received significant local, na-
tional, and international press coverage. 215
211. See, e.g., Interview with Activist Representative of NGO, supra note 85;
Interview with President of Indigenous NGO, supra note 94; Participant, Statement
at the Commission for Environmental Cooperation's "Maize and Biodiversity Sym-
posium" (Mar. 11, 2004).
212. Interview with Coordinator of Campesino NGO, supra note 88.
213. Interview with Staff Attorney of International Environmental NGO, supra
note 123; Interview with Coordinator of Campesino NGO, supra note 88.
214. Interview with Coordinator of Campesino NGO, supra note 88.
215. Id.; Interview with Coordinator of National Environmental NGO, supra
note 86; see also Victor M. Sanchez, Contaminar transginicos maices criollos de
Oaxaca & con tortillas de malz criollo se manifiestan, EL IMPARCIAL, Mar. 12,
2004, at 3A (articles on CEC symposium and surrounding protests in major Oaxaca
newspaper); Angelica Enciso & Victor R. Arrazola, Mexico debe mantener la pro-
hibici6n de sembrar transginicos: CCAAN & Toledo defiende las semillas criollas,
LA JORNADA, Mar. 12, 2004, available at http://www.jornada.unam.mx/2004/03/
12/soc-jus.php?fly= 1 (articles on CEC symposium and surrounding protests in
Mexican national newspaper); Diego Cevallos, Environment-Mexico: Transgenic
Cousin in the Birthplace of Corn, IPS-INTER PRESS SERVICE, Mar. 11, 2004, avail-
able in LEXIS, News Library (article on CEC symposium by global news service).
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An additional opportunity high-profile international events like
the Symposium can offer to local activists is the possibility of increas-
ing their local and regional legitimacy. One activist, highly skeptical
of Article 13 and other institution-centered strategies, explained why
his group decided to participate in a highly visible way during the
Symposium:
[The CEC Forum] interested us because we realized ... during
2001, 2002, and 2003 in Oaxaca, despite the fact that we were giv-
ing information in the communities, [society] hadn't taken us into
account .... They dismissed us as crazy ... ."Those nuts, who
knows what they're talking about?" . .. But when the CEC event
comes, people say, "Hey, those nuts are right! So we do have to lis-
ten!",
2 16
According to this activist, the CEC symposium helped frame the GM
controversy in local terms, generating more local interest in his or-
ganization's work:
[B]ecause if the [CEC Symposium] is going to talk about Oax-
aca... and if the event is taking place in... Oaxaca, then people
said, "Well, I do think it is an Oaxaca problem. So we're going to
listen and see what is going on .... And that permitted us, the dif-
ferent organizations that were working on the issue. .. to be better
understood by the media and by civil society. .. . That made it
possible that ... they began to believe us . . . . [Tihey said, "OK,
they're not 'those nuts' anymore. They are people that have infor-
mation, and we're going to listen to them." So, let's say that le-
gitimated the work we had been doing previously. 217
Finally, for some local participants, the Symposium presented a
valuable opportunity to directly confront domestic governmental offi-
cials. One participant, speaking before the entire Symposium, de-
scribed how the CEC had finally presented the opportunity to voice
his concerns directly to the Mexican government:
For all the people that come from outside maybe you are surprised
by the dynamic of this meeting. Well, I wanted to tell you why the
dynamics of this meeting are so surprising. It's the first public
meeting where the communities can express themselves in this
country. We have to go to international institutions so that the men
216. Interview with President of Indigenous NGO, supra note 94.
217. Id.
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from CIBIOGEM [Mexican federal commission on GMOs and bio-
security] can sit here and we can discuss things with them andtalk .21V
Taken together, the experiences of Mexican activists' illustrate
that one key factor for generating short-term domestic engagement by
groups that do not routinely participate in international events is to of-
fer sufficiently attractive incentives, many of which can be described
as "secondary consequences" of participation. As a policy goal, many
international soft law mechanisms, including those in the CEC, strive
to attract the broader involvement of local civil society groups.21 9 Of-
ten, the public rhetoric that these institutions direct towards civil soci-
ety groups is designed to assure them that, as the CEC Executive Di-
rector stated in his opening remarks at the Symposium, "[Their] input
will be taken into account," or, in other words, that local groups' par-
ticipation will have primary consequences on these institutions' deci-
sions and policies. 220 Yet, given the political realities of international
institutions and their relatively weak formal powers, many local
groups are all too aware that their influence on decision-making in
such settings may be indirect at best and, and at worst, non-existent.
Activists' experiences illustrate that many local civil society groups
while skeptical of the primary consequences of engagement with in-
ternational institutions, are nonetheless highly conscious of benefits
the secondary consequences of their involvement in international insti-
tutions can have. 221 Those interested in attracting local groups on a
broader basis must carefully consider the secondary consequences
such international mechanisms may offer to local groups skeptical of
international institutions, such as: visibility, legitimation, and access
to local decision-makers. As will be discussed in the following sec-
tion, this broader local engagement can significantly affect not only
those who participate in international events, but also the types of
218. Participant, Statement at the Commission for Environmental Coopera-
tion's "Maize and Biodiversity Symposium" (Mar. 11, 2004).
219. See, e.g., NAAEC, supra note 3, pmbl.
220. William Kennedy, Remarks at the Commission for Environmental Coop-
eration's "Maize and Biodiversity Symposium" (Mar. 11, 2004).
221. See, e.g., Interview with President of Indigenous NGO, supra note 94;
Participant, Statement at the Commission for Environmental Cooperation's "Maize
and Biodiversity Symposium," supra note 218; Interview with Activist Representa-
tive of NGO, supra note 85.
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claims participants raise and the impacts of those claims on interna-
tional institutions.
ii. Impact of Short-Term Domestic Ties on Claims-Making
Short-term participation by a broader range of domestic groups
can impact activists' claims-making in at least two ways. First, be-
cause a broader variety of groups with a wider variety of motivations
is being mobilized, those groups may also employ a broader variety of
tactics than would groups who were all uniformly engaged with the
international institution over the long-term. Second, because this
broader variety of groups also reflects a broader variety of constituen-
cies and backgrounds, these groups may also present a greater array of
substantive claims.
In the CEC Maize Symposium, a wide range of participants em-
ployed a wide range of tactics to make their voices heard. Some local
groups, who were generally skeptical of international institutions but
had decided to attend the event, readily employed direct action tactics
since they believed that they would otherwise have no impact:
The government doesn't listen to arguments. It doesn't pay atten-
tion to anything but strength. So all of us, already knowing
this... what we did was organize ourselves ... to come to the ses-
sion .... so that the pressure was seen. It wasn't so much to con-
vince [the Commission] with arguments. 222
Similarly, groups who attended the forum primarily to make their own
local work more visible also adopted confrontational and dramatic tac-
tics to bring greater public and media attention. 223 An organizer of the
protest march to the hotel where the Symposium was to take place ex-
plained why, strategically, a non-violent public confrontation would
serve the group's purposes:
Our main purpose was to exercise an act of public pressure and to
have an impact in the media .... So, it was leaving the [alternative]
forum, having a march, advising the local media that we're march-
ing through the street. And then the whole group from the forum
arrived at the elegant hotel [where the CEC Symposium was to take
place], and in that elegant hotel, we knew we were going to have
222. Interview with Coordinator of Indigenous NGO, supra note 112.
223. Interview with Coordinator of Campesino NGO, supra note 88.
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difficulty. And that was perfectly fine.
224
Local groups employed such confrontational tactics both outside
and inside the Symposium. One of the most dramatic examples oc-
curred early on, when a member of the Popular Indigenous Congress
(CIPO) challenged the moderator's insistence that no individual public
comment should exceed two minutes:
MODERATOR: Excuse me -
SPEAKER: Excuse yourself because I'm in my country, and what's
more [this] is in the name of the ... twenty-three communities my
organization represents because we don't have money like you to
be able to rent this hotel, the most expensive in Oaxaca. [The com-
munities] couldn't come and no way are we going to allow [ap-
plause] us not to say the words that they trusted us to say. You
can't tell us how much time to use and if all the other sisters and
brothers need to speak, well then, [so] they take their time, because
this forum is to say that we do not agree with transgenics
and.., you... aren't going to tell me when I must speak and when
I must be silent.225
Following this exchange, the moderator significantly relaxed the two-
minute rule, and when he occasionally tried to enforce it, other par-
ticipants also insisted on finishing. 226 Confrontational tactics were so
widespread that at times mutually-enforcing direct actions took place
simultaneously in multiple arenas. One activist describes the moment
when the CEC relented to protesters' demands that it remove the pre-
registration requirements to attend the Symposium:
[W]e were carrying sound equipment-when the people from the
Commission [said] "you can't enter," then we said, "Okay, we're
going to have a meeting outside. . ." [W]e were making a huge up-
roar! ... [W]e were presenting our point of view before the media,
before the people, and saying that these governments didn't want to
hear us and that it was really bad that the Commission didn't want
to hear the people's point of view .... And our supporters who
224. Id.
225. Moderator & CIPO Representative, Statements at the Commission for
Environmental Cooperation's "Maize and Biodiversity Symposium," (Mar. 11,
2004).
226. Interview with Coordinator of National Environmental NGO, supra note
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were inside [the hotel].., they began. . . to do interven-
tions . . . saying "We don't see even why there is a forum. That's
Oaxacan civil society represented. The Commission has to hear
them"... [U]ntil finally the Commission President decided to let
[us] in. 227
In each of the previous examples, none of the activists had been
involved in the preparation, filing, or follow-up to the Article 13 peti-
tion. However, their willingness to employ confrontational tactics at
the Symposium had a highly significant impact on the trajectory and
consequences of petitioners' claims. Social and political scientists
have theorized that direct action and other confrontational tactics can
play a critical role in forming new and emergent norms by defying ex-
pectations and openly challenging accepted boundaries of appropri-
ateness. 28 One implication of this is that direct action and other con-
frontational tactics are intimately linked to norm development and
should be considered as connected to-and not separate from-an
analysis of activists' claims-making activities in international institu-
tions.229 Insofar as one common feature of soft law is its capacity to
respond to emergent norms and to go further and faster than hard law,
one would expect direct action tactics to play a pivotal role in soft law
institutions' recognition of newly developing norms and claims. One
of the most striking aspects of the wide variety of confrontational tac-
tics that local activists employed both inside and outside the Maize
Symposium was the extent to which many of them, such as the pro-
tests over pre-registration and the two minute rule, were directed to-
wards offering an opportunity for a wider variety of participants to
bring a wider variety of claims. In one activist's words, these inter-
ventions were "[a way of] imposing our rules on the rules of the
[CEC] conference. 2 30
Cumulatively, activists' confrontational tactics resisted and made
more visible the exercise of power within the Symposium regarding
who could attend, how long one could speak, and what type of knowl-
edge and communication was valued. Overall, these tactics widened
227. Interview with Coordinator of Campesino NGO, supra note 88.
228. Martha Finnemore & Kathryn Sikkink, International Norm Dynamics and
Political Change, 52 INT'L ORG. 887, 897-98 (1998).
229. Id.
230. Interview with Coordinator of Campesino NGO, supra note 88.
54
California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 37, No. 1 [2006], Art. 3
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol37/iss1/3
2006] THE SECONDARY CONSEQUENCES OF INT'L INSTITUTIONS 117
the range of claims raised in the Symposium to include, according to
one participant, "a river of various expressions." 231 This "river of ex-
pressions" became so great that at one point one of the original civil
society petitioners felt it was necessary to make a public statement
during the Symposium to clarify the group's viewpoint.232
One striking example of local groups' participation expanding the
variety of claims raised beyond those brought by the original petition-
ers was the emphasis local groups placed on explicitly challenging the
weight the Article 13 process gave to scientific knowledge in resolv-
ing the GM maize controversy. Civil society petitioners had strategi-
cally decided to limit their original Article 13 petition to a relatively
narrow, scientific examination of GM maize's environmental im-
pacts.233 This included a decision not to request that the CEC consider
sociocultural matters in developing its recommendations.234 Petition-
ers feared such a request might be beyond the scope of the Article 13
mechanism and they did not want to increase the risk that the CEC
would reject their petition.235
In contrast, short-term participants in the Symposium, who were
not operating under such constraints, openly challenged the privileged
role the CEC's Article 13 mechanism seemed to bestow on scientific
knowledge.236 Some local activists explicitly questioned the value of
modern biotechnology in comparison to longstanding traditional
knowledge: "What is more valuable, a science that is just... starting
up... like... biotechnology, genetic experimentation, and clon-
ing..., or a science that has been proven again and again... for more
than 9000 years? ' 237 Others emphasized the ultimate inability of sci-
231. Interview with Coordinator of National Environmental NGO, supra note
86.
232. Interview with Activist Representative of NGO, supra note 85.
233. Interview with Staff Attorney of International Environmental NGO, supra
note 123.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. See, e.g., statement of Participant at the Commission for Environmental
Cooperation's "Maize and Biodiversity Symposium" (Mar. 11, 2004); statement of
Participant at the Commission for Environmental Cooperation's "Maize and Biodi-
versity Symposium" (Mar. 11, 2004).
237. Statement of Participant at the Commission for Environmental Coopera-
tion's "Maize and Biodiversity Symposium" (Mar. 11, 2004).
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ence to resolve the controversy: "Questions are going to keep coming
up more and more .... They are questions which are not going to
have an answer. Sometimes we must stop being so rational and scien-
tific.,,2 3
8
As an alternative, many short-term participants emphasized the
sociocultural importance of maize. At the Symposium's outset, a rep-
resentative of an indigenous organization read a manifesto that had
been prepared as part of the independent forum the previous day. In
part, it states:
We are people of maize. The grain is our brother, foundation of our
culture, the reality of our being here. It is in the center of our daily
life .... In Oaxaca we will not have transgenics. The fear, for us,
is that [scientists] are doing it entirely without concern for the im-
mense cultural damage that their experiments can cause. We are
not going to listen to them any more.239
Consistent with the emphasis on sociocultural matters, many local par-
ticipants emphasized the situated nature of all knowledge, and chal-
lenged the assertion that the CEC or science could serve as a neutral
arbiter. One member of an indigenous group forcefully questioned the
CEC and its expert panel during the Symposium: "You all say that
you have an impartial position. We can't be here saying, 'Yes, that
[this] is an impartial position.' My position is partial from this
side." 240
Ultimately, in comparison to the relatively minor role given to so-
ciocultural matters in the original petition, sociocultural matters ended
up playing a major role in the CEC's Article 13 recommendations. 24'
Many of the report's most sweeping policy recommendations, such as
requiring labeling and milling of GM maize, were categorized as "so-
ciocultural" and not as "scientific" matters,242 suggesting that the
wider range of claims and tactics short-term participants raised in the
238. Id.
239. Manifesto of the Forum in Defense of Our Maize in Oaxaca, Mex. (Mar.
10, 2004), http://site.www.umb.edu/faculty/ salzman-g/Strate/Salz/2004-03-10.htm.
240. Statement of Participant at the Commission for Environmental Coopera-
tion's "Maize and Biodiversity Symposium" (Mar. 11, 2004).
241. See Maize and Biodiversity, supra note 45, at 31.
242. Id.
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Symposium had significant impact. One of the original civil society
petitioners reflected:
I think this meeting [of the CEC Maize Symposium] was what
paved the way for the... sociocultural chapter [in the CEC re-
port] ... The chapter was a part of the study's methods that we [as
petitioners] weren't expecting. The expectation for the [sociocul-
tural] chapter was that it was unexpected. . . . [I]f you compare
what we asked for [in the petition], which [was] basically environ-
mental issues, with the sociocultural issues or even the health is-
sues, which we also didn't.., think this report could explore-I
think that. .. it really is an innovative study.
24 3
By challenging fundamental assumptions regarding both the participa-
tion format and the role of scientific knowledge in the Article 13 proc-
ess, local domestic groups' short-term participation in the Maize
Symposium created an opening for the CEC to institutionally re-
evaluate those assumptions and ultimately, to shape the Article 13 re-
port's recommendations. As short-term participants, locally-based
groups responded to a wide variety of incentives that attracted a larger
range of actors, many of whom fundamentally disagreed with the
CEC's institutional norms and principles. 244 In contrast, long-term
participants who had already demonstrated a willingness to commit a
sustained level of resources and energy to the CEC had less motiva-
tion to overtly and publicly challenge the fundamental assumptions
that formed the basis of the Article 13 mechanism-such as the role of
scientific and technical knowledge. Local short-term participation of-
fered a distinct and significant form of public pressure.
Finally, domestic activists' short-term involvement in the CEC
Maize Symposium raises important questions regarding how an emer-
gent transnational public sphere is conceived. Much legal and non-
legal scholarship has theorized emergent transnational public spaces in
terms of cosmopolitan democratic participation, extensive transborder
civil society coalition activity, and the development of robust regional
identities. However, one must ask whether the participatory and in-
clusive ideals contained in such formulations are likely to be realized
243. Interview with Staff Attorney of International Environmental NGO, supra
note 123.
244. See, e.g., Interview with President of Indigenous NGO, supra note 94; In-
terview with Coordinator of Campesino NGO, supra note 88.
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if transnational public spaces are conceptualized exclusively or even
predominantly in those terms. It may be that transnational civil soci-
ety participation needs to be understood not only in terms of transna-
tional cosmopolitanism, but also in terms of the shifting, and at times
transitory, participation of actors whose work and orientation remain
profoundly local. If this is the case, then a fundamental rethinking of
the role of local participation in transnational spaces may be required
to expand how such transnational spaces are imagined. Such a re-
thinking would go beyond envisioning transnational public spaces
solely in terms of the opportunities they offer local participants to de-
velop transnational identities and long-term cosmopolitan commit-
ments, to also focusing on how transnational public spaces can engage
local participants, on local terms, however temporarily. Over the
long-term, it may be that it is the very fluid and necessarily temporary
nature of local participation that is most likely to lead to soft law par-
ticipatory mechanisms' transformative potential, the evanescence of
such participation becoming its very strength.
CONCLUSION
This article has argued for the value of studying secondary conse-
quences of international institutions on civil society actors and claims-
making as a way to more fully understand the actual impacts of these
institutions. It has applied this approach to examining Mexican civil
society actors' experiences with the North American Commission on
Environmental Cooperation, focusing on how different soft law
mechanisms for public participation have impacted activists' transna-
tional and domestic networks, and in turn, their claims-making activ-
ity. Activists' experiences suggest the need for international law
scholars to pay greater attention to international institutions' impacts
on a wider set of civil society relationships than they have tradition-
ally: weak and strong; domestic and international; as well as short and
long-term. It is only if this wider set of relationships and their effects
on activists' strategies and claims-making are taken into account, that
international law scholars and others who care about the actual im-
pacts of international institutions will be able to more fully understand
the current and future impacts of those institutions.
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